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Abstract 
This study investigates underpricing of private equity (PE)- backed IPOs and the various exit 
routes available to PE firms. First, we examine whether IPO underpricing differ across PE-
backed- and non-backed (NB) firms employing different empirical techniques. Our final 
dataset consists of 60 PE-backed- and 155 NB IPOs listed on Nordic exchanges (2005-2014). 
Second, we investigate exit strategies- and (potential) interrelation between entry and exit by 
PE firms, through interviews with partners from renowned PE firms (Altor, EQT, FSN 
Capital, Herkules Capital and HitechVision). 
We found PE-backed IPOs to be significantly less underpriced than NB IPOs, consistent with 
prior research. Interview respondents attribute our result to i) PE-sponsors may be superior at 
timing- and promoting IPOs and/or ii) PE-sponsors may strive to maximise the offer price to 
boost proceeds. Consensus in prior research attributes our finding to PE-sponsors being able 
to certify true firm value in IPOs. Moreover, we document significantly lower underpricing of 
venture capital - compared to buyout-backed IPOs. Finally, we find that underpricing 
increases with the aftermarket volatility (and thereby the risk) related to an issue, independent 
of PE-backing.   
Respondents from interviews listed price, transaction risk and divestment efficiency as the 
most important factors determining choice of exit route. The majority expressed strong 
preference for trade sales (ceteris paribus) as it enables efficient divestment and commonly 
provides superior pricing. In contrast, IPO appeared to represent the least favourable exit 
channel due to inefficient divestment and extensive regulation. However, the respondents 
underlined that IPOs may represent the preferred exit for particularly successful (and large) 
portfolio firms, as it “enables participation in future value creation while at the same time 
taking some “risk off the table”” - Respondent 4. Finally, we find that exit opportunities 
related to an investment case may have decisive implications for whether PE-sponsors enter 
or not. 
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1 Introduction 
 Background  
“In the early 2000s, the PE industry was dominated by generalists who managed to deliver 
abnormal returns due to being “world champions” in excel modelling. Today, everybody are 
“world champions” in excel. Hence, profitability in the PE industry now requires industry-
specific knowledge and experience unique to the particular PE firm” – Interview respondent 
2.   
This study can be viewed as a two-step analysis employing both empirical- and qualitative 
approaches. First, we examine whether underpricing of Nordic IPOs differ across PE-backed 
and NB firms using various empirical techniques. Second, we investigate exit strategies- and 
the (potential) interrelation between entry and exit by PE-sponsors, through in-depth 
interviews with key industry players in the Nordic PE landscape. 
The fact that the average IPO is significantly underpriced is well-documented in academic 
research. Despite this, there appears to be universal consensus explaining the phenomenon. 
However, most theoretical concepts and empirical research attribute the underpricing puzzle 
to information being asymmetrically distributed between relevant stakeholders in IPOs.   
 Research questions 
Prior research suggests PE-backed IPOs exhibit significantly lower underpricing (on average) 
than NB IPOs (see Table 3-2). However, most existing studies on PE-backed IPOs focus on 
the US market, implying there are few empirical studies on PE-backed IPOs in the Nordic 
region (see Table 3-2). In addition, exit strategies by PE-sponsors have received limited 
attention in prior research. Hence, the objective of this thesis is to contribute to the limited 
academic literature on i) Nordic PE-backed IPOs and ii) exits by PE-sponsors. More 
specifically, we aim to answer the following research questions:  
1. What is the effect (if any) of PE-backing on the degree of underpricing for IPOs 
listed on Nordic exchanges? 
2. What are key drivers behind choice of exit route by Nordic PE-sponsors and how 
may entry- and exit of portfolio firms represent interrelated events?  
To answer research question 1, we conducted a time-consuming, but rewarding data 
gathering process. Thorough research and screening resulted in 60 PE-backed IPOs and 155 
NB IPOs listed on Nordic exchanges (excl. Iceland) between January 2005 and December 
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2014. The PE-backed sample was compared to i) 1:1 matched-control IPOs based on industry 
classification and offer size and ii) the entire pool of control IPOs. We relied on both 
univariate testing (parametric- and non-parametric tests) and multivariate regressions when 
analysing the effect of PE-backing on IPO underpricing.   
To answer research question 2, we conducted in-depth interviews with key industry players 
representing the renowned Nordic PE firms; Altor Equity Partners, EQT, FSN Capital, 
Herkules Capital and HitechVision. More precisely, we spoke to one deputy CEO, one former 
CEO (now chairman and partner) and three partners (one is also head of the Norwegian 
subsidiary) of Nordic PE firms in addition to one industry-expert with experience from 
Acquisition Finance (i.e. acquisitions related to LBOs). The interviews gave us first-hand 
information about key factors driving the choice of exit route, the interrelation between the 
entry- and exit of portfolio firms, trends in the Nordic PE industry in addition to thoughts 
regarding our empirical results.  
 Structure  
The structure of the thesis is as follows; Chapter 2 presents an overview of PE as an asset 
class, i.e. definition of key terminology, organisation and structure of PE transactions, brief 
history and a short description of PE in the Nordic region. Chapter 3 and 4 summarise prior 
research- and relevant theory on the underpricing phenomenon, underpricing of PE-backed 
IPOs in particular and PE exits. Chapter 5 and 6 present detailed descriptions of the research 
methodology (empirical and qualitative) applied in our analysis, matching procedure, data 
gathering and sample selection process, how we obtained firm-specific information necessary 
(i.e. offer prices, closing prices, underwriters etc.) and how we distinguished between venture 
capital (VC)- and buyout (BO)-backed IPOs. Chapter 7 presents our results and a discussion 
of the results in relation to established empirical research and theoretical concepts. Finally, we 
present our overall conclusion regarding i) the effect of PE-backing on IPO underpricing in 
the Nordic region and ii) key factors determining choice of exit route and how entry- and exit 
of portfolio firms may represent interrelated events.  
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2 Private equity: Structure, history and the Nordic market  
 Structure and organization 
Cendrowski, Marin, Petro and Wadecki (2012, p. 4) define “private equity” (PE) as a 
“medium or long-term equity investment that is not publically traded on an exchange”. PE 
represents a possible funding source for start-up- and growth firms (ventures), more mature 
firms (buyouts) and firms in financial distress1. Thus, PE transactions are usually separated 
into two main categories, namely venture capital- (VC) and buyout (BO) transactions (see 
Figure 2-1)2.   
VC encompasses investments in both early stage (seed) and expansion (growth) ventures 
(Argentum Private Equity, 2015a). The BO classification typically include public-to-private- 
and private-to-private BOs, in addition to subsidiaries of private and public companies 
(Schöber, 2008). BO transactions characterised with considerable debt financing are usually 
referred to as leveraged BOs (LBOs). It is worth mentioning that the PE market for BOs is 
considerably greater than that of VC, in terms of funding (Splid, 2013).  
Figure 2-2 depicts the typical organisational structure of the PE investment process and the 
involved parties. The different stakeholders are:  
 Portfolio firms: A portfolio firm represents a firm in which a PE fund has made direct 
investments. The private ownership period is typically between 2 and 7 years 
(Cendrowski et al., 2012). 
 General Partners (GPs): The GPs represent a group of partners organised as a PE firm 
responsible for managing the PE fund3. In addition, the GPs (often) represent “active 
                                                          
1 The term “private equity” encompasses both VC- and BO firms in our study (see section 6.1.2 for classification of VC and BO). 
2 We refer to venture capitalists as “VC-sponsors”. Sponsors of BO transactions are referred to as “BO-sponsors”.  
3 We use “PE firm” and “PE-sponsor” interchangeably when referring to the formal organisation of GP.  
Venture capital  
(Start-ups, growth firms, etc.)  
Buyout 
(Mature firms, mid- to large-cap firms, 
distressed firms, etc.)  
Private equity  
Figure 2-1: Types of PE transactions (Argentum Private Equity, 2015a) 
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managers” of the portfolio firms, meaning they attempt to add value during the 
(private) ownership period. The GPs are often compensated based on the performance 
of the PE funds.  
 Limited Partners (LPs): LPs represent the investors providing capital to the PE funds 
(i.e. the Limited Partnership). They are typically institutional investors or high net 
worth individuals and are not involved in the management of the PE fund.  
The main objective for GPs is to add value to its portfolio firms during the ownership period 
and realising satisfying profits through various exit strategies (e.g. M&A, IPO etc.). The 
average PE fund has a fixed life of ten years, during which the GPs identify, monitor/manage 
and exits a selection of portfolio firms (Fenn, Liang, & Prowse, 1997). The GPs typically 
assist in design of corporate strategy, optimise the capital structure, have members on the 
board of directors, choose the (potentially new) management and monitor management 
behaviour. The LPs, on the other hand, are not involved with day-to-day operations of the 
portfolio firms.  
Portfolio firm  
PE firm  
(General 
Partners/PE-
sponsors) 
Portfolio firm  Portfolio firm  
PE Fund 
(Limited Partnership) 
Limited Partners  
(Pension funds, high net-worth individuals,  
corporations, insurance companies, endowments, sovereign 
wealth funds etc.) 
Provide capital  
(fund owners) 
Manages the PE fund 
• Identify/screen opportunities 
• Transact and close deals 
• Monitor and add value 
• Identify profitable exit 
strategies 
• Raise additional funds 
  
Invests 
Figure 2-2: The PE process and structure. Authors’ chart inspired by Exhibit 1.3 (p. 15) in “Private Equity: History, 
Governance, and Operations” by Cendrowski et al. (2012) 
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In summary, the main rationale behind the structure outlined in Figure 2-2, is to align interests 
and incentives of the GPs and LPs. GPs have incentives to pursue the interests of the LPs (i.e. 
maximise fund return), not only to receive their stake of the fund return, but also in order to 
raise new funds in the future (through good reputation).   
 Life cycle of PE funds  
The life cycle of PE funds involve four distinct stages; Fundraising, investment, management 
and divestment (exit) (see Figure 2-3). In concordance with our focus on PE in the Nordic 
region, the following discussion will focus on the Nordic PE market. The term “Nordic” in 
this study refers to Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (i.e. excluding Iceland).  
 Fundraising  
The fundraising typically takes 0.5 to 1.5 years, and involves recruiting LPs (investors) in 
addition to establishing a strategy and investment focus for the PE fund (Cendrowski et al., 
2012). The fund closes for additional investors when it reaches a pre-determined size (e.g. 
EUR 500 million). As depicted in Table 2-1, the majority of LPs in the Nordic region are 
funds-of-funds and other asset managers in addition to pension funds. Combined, they 
contributed with almost 60% of the overall fundraising by Nordic PE-firms in 2014 (EVCA, 
2015a).  
Table 2-1: Nordic4 fund distribution by type of investor (LP) (2014) 
 
Fundraising by investor-type by Nordic PE-firms. Statistic provided by EVCA (2015a). 
 % of fund  % of fund 
Academic inst./Endowments/ Foundations 14.4% Sovereign wealth funds 7.1% 
Family offices & Private individuals 9.0% Capital markets 1.3% 
Pension funds 27.4% Government agencies 6.4% 
Banks 0.7% Corporate investors 0.5% 
Funds of funds & other asset managers 28.4% Insurance companies 4.8% 
 
                                                          
4 Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
Fundraising Investment Management Divestment  
Years 0-1.5 Years 4-10 Years 1-4 Years 2-7 
Figure 2-3: Stages related to the life-cycle of PE-funds. Chart inspired by Exhibit 1.2 in “Private Equity: History, 
Governance and Operations” by Cedrowski et al. (2012) 
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 Investment  
During the investment phase, the GPs identify and screen investment opportunities in line 
with the fund’s strategy and focus. Potential targets represent publically listed- or private 
companies and subsidiaries of public/private companies. The investment phase typically 
stretches from year 1 to 4 of the fund’s life cycle (Cendrowski et al., 2012).  
 Management 
The management phase commonly encompass year 2 through year 7 of the fund’s life cycle. 
During this stage, the GPs aim to increase the value of the portfolio firms through active 
management in addition to making financial, operational and strategic improvements. To 
support the development and growth of the portfolio firms (e.g. built-on acquisitions and/or 
substantial investments) additional funds may be raised during this period (Cendrowski et al., 
2012). 
 Divestment (exit) 
The divestment period usually begins around year 4 and lasts until the liquidation of the PE 
fund at the end of its life cycle. During this period, the GPs aim to realise all investments prior 
to the liquidation of the fund (Cendrowski et al., 2012). The investments may be divested 
through various exit channels, such as sale to industrial players (trade sale), sale to another 
financial investor (secondary buyout) or sale to public investors (IPO), among other exit 
channels (see Figure 4-1). As depicted in Figure 2-4, trade sale constituted by far the most 
common exit route in the Nordic region in 2014, accounting for almost 50% of all 
divestments. However, during the financial crisis (2008-2009), the majority of portfolio 
investments in Europe were forced to exit through write-offs5 (EVCA , 2010).  
                                                          
5 Total/partial write-down of the investment (e.g. portfolio firm), implying return to investors close to 100% (i.e. value of investment is 
eliminated). 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
PE-backed IPOs on Nordic exchanges
Trade sale: 
49%
Secondary BO: 22%
MBO: 7%
IPO: 7%
Write-off: 7%
Other: 8%
Divestment by exit type in the Nordics
Figure 2-4: Divestment by exit type (in terms of number of 
firms) by PE-funds in the Nordic region in 2014 
(Argentum Private Equity, 2015b) 
 
 
Figure 2-5: The number of PE-backed IPOs listed on 
Nordic exchanges between 2007 and 2014 (Argentum 
Private Equity, 2015b)  
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Furthermore, IPO appears to represent a relatively uncommon exit-route in the Nordic region, 
especially during the financial crisis (2008-2009) (see Figure 2-4 and Figure 2-5). The latter 
can likely be attributed to challenging and volatile stock markets (i.e. “cold” IPO markets) 
resulting in less attractive IPO valuations compared to market “peaks” (Argentum Private 
Equity, 2015). However Figure 2-5 suggests IPO as an exit-strategy is approaching pre-crisis 
levels with 2014 representing the “turn-around” year. IPO as an exit route is discussed in 
greater detail in section 4.1.3. 
 History 
The emergence of the PE industry can be dated back to 1946, with the establishment of a 
closed-end investment company called American Research and Development Corporation 
(ARD). Prior to World War II, there were considerable concerns regarding the lack of 
funding- and long-term financing for new and small ventures. Consequently, ARD was 
formed as a response to these concerns with an objective to represent a private-funding 
solution for small ventures. In addition, ARD also aimed to provide managerial expertise to 
new ventures as they believed capital alone was insufficient to ensure healthy development of 
new businesses (Fenn et al., 1997).  
In the 1980s, favourable regulatory changes and tax reforms in the US combined with the 
emergence of the Limited Partnership structure, created the first “boom” for the PE industry 
(in terms of fundraising). Organising the PE transactions as Limited Partnerships contributed 
to aligning the interests of different stakeholders; GPs are incentivised to pursue the interests 
of fund-owners and possesses authority to influence managers accordingly.  
The emergence of the high-yield bond market in the 1980s resulted in increased use of 
leverage in BO transactions (i.e. LBOs). Examples of renowned LBOs are Wometco 
Enterprises (1984), Revco Drug Stores (1986) and Marvel Entertainment (1988). However, as 
a consequence of the collapse of the junk bond market in 1989, the activity of highly 
leveraged deals decreased considerably (Splid, 2013). In the subsequent years (the early 
1990s) PE investments were less based on exploiting the benefits of leverage (e.g. interest tax 
shields) and more focused on making operational improvements. In the mid-2000, the PE 
industry experienced another “boom” and flourished with high levels of fundraising and a 
large number of deals (Preqin Ltd., 2014). 
However, during the financial turmoil in 2008 and 2009, the industry was challenged by poor 
global economic conditions and plummeting returns on their PE funds. Several fund investors 
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(LPs) faced liquidity problems, as they found themselves over-allocated in alternative 
investments. This resulted in investors fleeing the PE landscape and thereby leaving the PE 
funds with historically low levels of fundraising and investments (Cendrowski et al., 2012). 
As indicated by Figure 2-6, the European PE industry has still not recovered from the 
financial crisis (neither in terms of fundraising nor investments).  
 
Figure 2-6: Annual fundraising and investments by European PE firms. Authors' calculations based on statistics 
from EVCA (2015b) 
 
 The Nordic PE industry  
PE as an asset class emerged in the Nordic region in the beginning of the 1990s, along with 
the shift towards focus on operational improvements (Splid, 2013). Since its somewhat late 
start, the Nordic region has become one of the most active markets in the European PE 
industry, both in terms of fundraising and investments (Splid, 2013). In 2014, fundraising by 
Nordic GPs totalled EUR 5.9 billion, corresponding to more than 13% of total funds raised in 
Europe. Investments in Nordic portfolio firms summarised to EUR 3.9 billion in 2014, which 
constituted 10% of all investments in European portfolio firms (EVCA, 2015a). Sweden has 
historically represented the Nordic country associated with the largest annual PE investments 
(Argentum Private Equity, 2014). However, the Norwegian PE market passed the Swedish 
one in 2013 and now represents the most active country in the Nordic PE market, both in 
terms of investments and fundraising (see Figure 2-7 and Figure 2-8). 
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The Nordic PE market appear to be The The  
The Nordic PE market appear to be recovering more rapidly from the financial crisis than 
remaining parts of Europe (compare Figure 2-6 and Figure 2-9). Splid (2013) postulates 
several potential explanations for the (potentially) more rapid recovery of the Nordic PE 
market. First, Nordic PE funds raised considerable amounts of capital prior to the crisis and 
thereby accumulated large amounts of capital to be invested. Second, their funds included 
relatively few distressed companies. Third, their main creditors (i.e. the Nordic banks) are 
relatively solid and stable compared to the banking sector in other parts of Europe 
(particularly southern parts). These factors ensured the Nordic PE funds maintained their 
solidity throughout the crisis, and subsequently gave the GPs the opportunity to buy targets at 
considerable discounts (Splid, 2013).  
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39%
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Denmark: 
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Finland: 
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Figure 2-7: Geographical distribution of fundraising by 
Nordic PE funds in 2014. (Argentum Private Equity, 
2015b) 
Figure 2-9: Annual fundraising and investments by Nordic PE firms. Authors' calculations based on statistics from 
EVCA (2015b) 
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Figure 2-8: Relative PE investments in 2014 by country of 
portfolio firm (Argentum Private Equity, 2015b) 
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Figure 2-10 depicts the relative distribution of PE investments by industry in the Nordic 
region, and the remaining parts of Europe, in 2014. The majority of overall PE investments in 
Europe and the Nordics were mainly associated with two industries, namely industrial and life 
sciences. However, firms operating in the energy sector represent a large share of investments 
in the Nordics compared to remaining parts of Europe. This can likely be attributed to 
Norway’s high activity in the oil and gas sector. Figure 2-10 also reveals that investments in 
the retail sector is more prominent in Europe (excl. Nordics) than in the Nordic region.    
 
Figure 2-10: Relative PE investments by industry, in the Nordic region and Europe (excl. Nordics) in 2014. Authors’ 
calculations based on statistics from EVCA (2015a) 
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3 Underpricing: Theory and literature review 
Underpricing of IPOs refers to the phenomenon that the average IPO tend to yield (abnormal) 
positive initial returns. The initial return represents the percentage change from the offering 
price to an aftermarket price within a short period (first day, week or month) after the 
offering. In the following sections we will first present existing empirical research on 
underpricing followed by theory on underpricing in general and variations between IPOs (see 
Figure 3-1). Subsequently, we follow the same structure when presenting previous research- 
and theory on underpricing of PE-backed IPOs in particular (see Figure 3-2). 
 
 
IPO underpricing  
What explains  
IPO underpricing?  
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Cross-sectional variance of 
IPO underpricing  
Issuing firm and 
public investors 
Underwriters and 
issuing firm 
Informed- and 
uninformed 
investors 
between: 
Certification 
hypothesis 
Ex-ante  
uncertainty 
“Hot issue”  
markets 
Participation 
rates 
Figure 3-1: Overview of theories on IPO underpricing (in general and variation between issues) presented in our study.. 
Authors’ chart based on elements/theories relevant for our analysis/study  
Figure 3-2: Theories and literature review of IPO underpricing of PE-backed IPOs in particular. Authors’ chart based on 
elements/theories relevant for our analysis/study  
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PE-backed IPOs 
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Certification by PE-
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 Underpricing of IPOs  
The fact that the average IPO is significantly underpriced is well documented in academic 
literature and has been examined by researchers since the 1960s (see Table 3-1).  
Table 3-1: Prior empirical research on IPO underpricing 
 
 
Authors Market (Period) Size Underpricing Comment 
Hatfield & Reilly (1969) US (1963-1966) 53 9.90% (mean) 
- Price on the first Friday after offering 
- Raw initial returns 
McDonald & Fisher (1972) US (1961) 142 28.50% (mean) 
- Price one week after the offering 
- Initial returns adjusted for OTC average of 
the National Quotation Bureau 
Ibbotson & Jaffe (1975) n/a (1960-1970) 128 
16.83% (mean) 
12.64% (median) 
- Closing bid price on the first day of the 
calendar month 
Ritter (1984) US (1977-1982) 1028 26.50% (mean) - First day closing bid price 
Beatty & Ritter (1986) US (1981-1982) 545 14.10% (mean) 
- First day closing bid price 
- Raw initial returns 
Miller & Reilly (1987) US (1982-1983) 510 9.87% (mean) 
- First day closing bid price 
- Initial returns adjusted for return on 
NASDAQ Industrial Index (OTC stocks) 
Ljungqvist & Wilhelm 
(2003) 
US (1996-2000) 2178 
35.70% (mean) 
13.90% (median) 
- First day closing price 
- Raw initial returns 
Loughran & Ritter (2004) US (1980-2003) 6391 18.70% (mean) 
- First day closing price 
- Raw initial returns 
Hahn , Ligon, & Rhodes 
(2013) 
Global (1988-2009) 2693 
27.80% (mean) 
11.10% (median) 
- First day closing price 
- Raw initial returns 
Pukthuanthong, Shi, & 
Walker (2013) 
Global (1995-2002) 6025 
29.30% (mean) 
18.80% (median) 
-  Price on the 15th calendar day after offering 
- Adjusted initial returns 
- Nordic underpricing (excl Iceland): 7.50% 
(mean) 
  
As depicted in Table 3-1, the mean underpricing varies considerably among the studies, 
ranging from 9.9% to 35.7%.  However, when comparing the results listed in Table 3-1, it is 
worth noting that both the aftermarket price and method (e.g. raw vs. adjusted returns) applied 
when calculating the initial returns, differ between the studies. Some studies use raw initial 
returns, while others adjust the returns using a benchmark (e.g. a stock market index). The 
earlier studies such as Hatfield and Reilly (1969), McDonald and Fisher (1972) and Ibbotson 
and Jaffe (1975) use aftermarket prices post the first trading day. On the contrary, more recent 
studies by Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2003) Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Hahn et al. (2013), 
use first day closing prices as proxy for aftermarket prices. In the context of Nordic IPOs, 
Pukthuanthong et al. (2013) document lower levels of IPO underpricing in the Nordic 
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countries compared to other countries6. They find the mean underpricing of Nordic IPOs to be 
7.5%, which is considerably lower than the overall average (for 34 countries) of 29.3%. 
 What explains IPO underpricing?  
There are numerous theories attempting to explain the underpricing phenomenon. The most 
prominent theories are based on the assumption that information about “true” firm (stock) 
value is asymmetrically distributed between relevant stakeholders in IPOs (i.e. issuing firm, 
investor and underwriters). Hence, we start by elaborating on how theories of asymmetric 
information may explain the underpricing phenomenon in general, before describing 
explanations to why we see cross-sectional variations between issues. It is worth noting that 
the theories do not necessarily represent substitutes, but rather compliments, as they assess 
different aspects of the process of going public (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995).  
 Asymmetric information  
Most models and theories of underpricing are based on informational asymmetry between the 
relevant stakeholders in IPOs. The different explanations depend on which stakeholder is 
assumed to have superior (relevant) information about “true” firm value.  
In the context of IPOs, information asymmetries may arise in (particularly) three relationships 
between stakeholders in IPOs. First, informational asymmetries may arise between insiders 
(initial owners and management) and outside investors, in which the former tend to have 
superior knowledge about the future prospects of the firm (Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate 
Finance, 2011). This may encourage insiders of IPOs to behave opportunistically at the 
expense of outsiders (e.g. to “cash out” prior to publication of bad news). Hence, outside 
investors may question insiders’ motivation behind the IPO and thereby reduce the price they 
are willing to pay for the offer (Booth & Smith (1986), Berk & DeMarzo (2011)).  
Second, informational asymmetries may arise between insiders and underwriters, in which the 
underwriters are assumed to possess superior knowledge about the market conditions and 
demand for IPOs (Baron (1982), Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1989)). Underwriters may then 
be incentivised to offer recurrent investors positive initial returns, through deliberate 
underpricing and targeted marketing (in order to enhance future business) (Loughran and 
Ritter (2002, 2004), Bergström, Nilsson and Wahlberg (2006)) (see section 3.3.1).  
                                                          
6 Pukthuanthong et al. (2013): Studied underpricing of 6025 IPOs in 34 different countries listed between 1995 and 2002. 
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Third, some scholars argue informational asymmetries between informed and uninformed 
investors may explain IPO underpricing (Beatty & Ritter (1986), Rock (1986), Levis (1990), 
Ibbotson & Ritter (1995)) See section 10.9, Appendix (the “Winner’s curse” problem) for 
detailed discussion of the consequences of information being asymmetrically distributed 
between informed- and uninformed investors. 
Previous research postulate several different proxies for the level of asymmetric information 
related to an issue. First, high-risk IPOs tend to be more underpriced than low-risk issues, due 
to the former being associated with higher levels of asymmetric information than the latter 
(Ritter, 1984). Normal proxies for risk are industries characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty (technology and telecommunications), aftermarket volatility, firm size (smaller 
firms riskier than large firms) and firm age (younger firms riskier than older/more mature 
firms). Supporting this, Helwege and Liang (2004) find that abnormally underpriced IPOs 
tend to be younger than less underpriced IPOs. Second, underpricing appear to ameliorate 
with the level of transparency associated with the IPO (Schöber, 2008). High levels of 
transparency (e.g. through informative prospectus, media coverage, prior trading history) may 
reduce the degree of asymmetric information related to an issue (and thereby also its 
underpricing).  
 Cross-sectional variation of IPO underpricing  
As noted by Schöber (2008), past studies reveal considerable cross-sectional variations in 
underpricing between IPOs. The theories discussed in this section attempt to explain why 
some IPOs are more (or less) underpriced than other IPOs.   
 Certification hypothesis: Underwriter reputation  
Klein and Leffler (1981) were among the first to discuss reputational signalling as potential 
certification of quality. They suggest that “non-salvageable investments” (i.e. costs related to 
an investment are considered sunk) can provide quality assurance of a firm’s products, since 
consumers may view such investments as commitment to produce high-quality products. In 
this thesis, the two certification mechanisms we deem the most relevant are underwriter 
reputation and PE-sponsor presence/reputation. 
Regarding underwriter reputation, Beatty and Ritter (1986), Booth and Smith (1986) and 
Carter and Manaster (1990) extend the reputational signalling hypothesis in an attempt to 
explain how underwriter reputation can certify the pricing of equity issues. It follows that 
underwriters frequently interact with capital markets through repeated issues and thereby have 
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reputational capital at stake. Hiring “prestigious” underwriters7 may represent a trustworthy 
signal that the price range reflects relevant (inside) information, since such underwriters may 
be incentivised to maintain their reputation through low levels of mispricing (Schöber, 2008). 
In line with these arguments, Carter and Manaster (1990) document that IPOs associated with 
“prestigious” underwriters are significantly less underpriced than other IPOs. Similarly, 
Beatty (1989) examines certification effects in relation to auditor reputation. He documents a 
negative relationship between underpricing and auditor reputation, consistent with the 
certification hypothesis.  
In contrast, other scholars argue that underwriters may be incentivised to deliberately 
underprice new issues. Baron (1982) argues that underwriters may intentionally underprice 
new issues to reduce IPO marketing costs and risk. Loughran and Ritter (2004, p. 9), on the 
other hand, suggest that underwriters may deliberately underprice an IPO if they expect 
“commission business in return for leaving money on the table8” (i.e. to induce investors to 
participate in additional issues).  
The (potential) certification effect by PE-sponsors is discussed in section 3.4.2. 
 Ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis9 
Beatty and Ritter (1986) examine the relationship between (expected) IPO underpricing and 
the level of ex-ante uncertainty related to an issue10. They argue that the level of underpricing 
increases with ex-ante uncertainty, since the “winner’s curse” problem11 amplifies with the 
uncertainty. This suggests, issuing firms may be incentivised to disclose information 
voluntarily in order to reduce the ex-ante uncertainty (and thereby the underpricing) 
associated with the issue. This reasoning is backed with empirical evidence provided by 
Beatty and Ritter (1986)12 and Miller and Reilly (1987).  
 “Hot” issue markets  
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984) were among the first to document the cyclicality 
of IPO activity and the existence of “hot” and “cold” issue markets. They define “hot issue 
markets” as periods when new issues yield abnormally high initial returns. In contrast, “cold” 
                                                          
7 The «prestige» is determined by a ranking developed by Carter and Manaster; the “Carter-Manaster (CM) rank”. 
8 Money on the table: Number of share sold*initial return (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). 
9 Also called: The asymmetric information hypothesis.  
10 Ex-ante uncertainty: Uncertainty about firm value once it starts trading. 
11 See section 10.9, Appendix for explanation of the “Winner’s curse”-problem in relation to IPO underpricing. 
12 Beatty and Ritter (1986) use two proxies for ex-ante uncertainty: i) log (1+ number of uses of proceeds listed in the prospectus). Issues 
with high numbers of uses are assumed related to higher ex-ante uncertainty as SEC requires speculative issues to provide detailed 
descriptions of use of proceeds, while more established firms are not required to be very specific. ii) Inverse of gross proceeds from the offer 
(as smaller offerings tend to be more speculative/associated with higher ex-ante uncertainty than larger issues, see Ritter (1987)).  
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issue markets refer to periods with below-average initial returns. To illustrate, the average 
underpricing was 48% in the “hot” issue market of 1980, while the average underpricing 
during the period 1977-1982 was 16% (Ritter, 1984). More recently, Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) document that the average underpricing was 65% in the “hot” dot-com years of 1999-
2000, while the corresponding number was “only” 12% during the “colder” IPO years of 
2001-2003.  
As noted by Ibbotson and Ritter (1995), it appears difficult to find rational explanations for 
the existence of “hot” issue markets. Despite this, prior research documents a strong positive 
correlation between IPO underpricing and market returns (Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist, 
1994). This indicates that “hot” issue markets tend to follow periods of high stock market 
returns. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) suggest that “hot” issue markets may be caused 
by irrational investor behaviour. They argue that such markets may be explained the presence 
of investors who are “irrationally exuberant about the prospects of IPOs” (e.g. from a specific 
industry or market).  
 Participation rates   
Habib and Ljunqvist (2001) attribute cross-sectional differences in IPO underpricing to wealth 
incentives of existing owners in new issues. It follows that existing owners may be 
incentivised to avoid underpricing in order to minimise the amount of “money left on the 
table”13.  Habib and Ljunqvist (2001) argue that insiders’ incentives to reduce underpricing 
depend on the fraction of shares retained in the IPO. When retention rates are high, insiders 
may care less about underpricing than when retention rates are low, since the cost of “leaving 
money on the table” is lower in the former. They stress that existing owners can affect the 
level of underpricing through the promotion choices they make, such as which underwriter- 
and exchange to use. Hence, they expect IPOs associated with high participation rates to be 
less underpriced than those with low participation rates. Empirical evidence from Habib and 
Ljunqvist (2001) and Hogan, Olson and Kish (2001) backs this proposition. 
 Underpricing of PE-backed IPOs  
In this study, we address IPOs backed by PE-, VC- and BO-sponsors as "PE”-, “VC”- and 
“BO-backed IPOs” respectively (in which “PE” refers to “VC” and “BO” collectively) and 
IPOs not backed by PE as “NB IPOs” (i.e. non-backed IPOs).  
                                                          
13 Money on the table: Number of share sold*initial return (Loughran & Ritter, 2002). 
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We have identified nine studies that compare the level of underpricing across PE-backed and 
NB IPOs (see Table 3-2). As revealed in Table 3-2, the average PE-backed IPO appears to 
yield positive initial returns, consistent with evidence presented on the underpricing 
phenomenon (see Table 3-1). The most recent studies of Schöber (2008) and Cao and Lerner 
(2009) document considerably higher levels of underpricing than earlier studies do. This can 
likely be explained by their studies including IPOs listed in the “hot” dot-com years of 1999-
2000 (Schöber, 2008). 
However, as indicated by Table 3-2, the majority of prior research find PE-backed IPOs to 
exhibit significantly lower levels of underpricing than NB IPOs. One study suggests greater 
underpricing of VC-backed- compared to non-VC-backed, but the difference is not 
statistically significant (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & Vetsuypens , 1990).   
Table 3-2: Prior empirical research on underpricing of PE-backed IPOs 
This table reports existing empirical evidence comparing underpricing across PE-backed and NB IPOs. Reverse LBOs (RLBOs) refer to 
LBOs that were publically traded prior to the buyout. 
*P< 10%, ** P< 5%, *** P< 1%.  
 
Authors 
Size & PE- 
type 
Market 
(Period) 
Underpricing PE-
backed IPOs 
Underpricing 
control IPOs Diff. Comment 
Muscarella and 
Vetsupypens 
(1989) 
RLBO: 74 
Control: 1114 
US  
(1983-1987) 
2.04% (mean) 
0.00% (median) 
7.97% (mean) 
1.78% /(median) 
-5.93%*** 
-1.78%** 
- No matching  
 
Barry et al. 
(1990) 
VC: 433 
Control: 1123 
n/a  
(1978-1987) 
8.43% (mean) 7.47% (mean) 0.96% - No matching 
Ainina and 
Mohan (1991) 
RLBO: 92 
Control: 92 
US 
(1983-1987) 
2.07% (mean) 2.78% (mean) -0.71% 
- Matching (1:1) 
based on 
distribution of 
assets 
Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) 
VC: 320 
Control: 320 
US  
(1983-1987) 
7.10% (mean) 11.90% (mean) -3.62%*** 
- Matched 1:1 
by industry and 
offer size 
Hogan et al. 
(2001) 
RLBO: 232 
Control: 232 
n/a 
 (1986-
1998) 
7.64% (mean) 13.00% (mean) -5.36%*** 
- Matched 1:1 
by industry offer 
size and - date 
Ang and Brau 
(2002) 
BO: 334 
Control: 334 
n/a  
(1981-1996) 
5.47% (mean) 8.04% (mean) -2.57%*** 
- Matched 1:1 
by offer size and 
-date  
(Mean between 
bid/ask) 
Bergström et al. 
(2006) 
PE: 152 
Control: 1370 
Paris & 
London 
 (1994-
2004) 
9.33% (mean) 12.87% (mean) -3.47% - No matching 
Schöber (2008) 
BO: 461 
Control: 461 
US  
(1973-2007) 
11.56% (mean) 
6.33% (median) 
16.34% (mean) 
11.56% (median) 
-4.78%*** 
-5.23%*** 
- Group 
matching by 
industry, date, 
offer - and asset 
size14 
Cao and Lerner 
(2009) 
RLBO: 437 
Control: 5706 
n/a  
(1981-2003) 
12.88% (mean) 22.18% (mean) -9.30% - No matching 
                                                          
14 Schöber used 6 different control samples, in which 4 were based on previous matching principles. This represents Schöber’s proprietary 
matching procedure, which matches each PE-backed IPO with a synthetic control IPO based on industry, IPO date, asset size, offer size.  
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 Ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis15 
As described in section 3.3.2, the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis attributes the (abnormal) 
underpricing to the level of ex-ante uncertainty related to an issue. Vetsuypens and 
Muscarella (1989), Fall Ainina and Mohan (1991) and more recently, Hogan et al. (2001) and 
Ang and Brau (2002), specifically study the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis in relation to 
reverse LBOs (RLBOs). The hypothesis predicts that RLBOs should exhibit lower 
underpricing than non-reverse IPOs, since the former should be associated with greater 
transparency as they have been previously traded (Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1989)16. Greater 
transparency is expected to reduce the level of ex-ante uncertainty related to an IPO and 
thereby also its underpricing. Consistent with this hypothesis, the studies referred to above 
find RLBOs to be significantly less underpriced than NB IPOs, even when controlling for key 
factors assumed to interrelate with initial returns.  
Based on abovementioned findings, Schöber (2008) hypothesises that lower underpricing of 
BO-backed IPOs in general (i.e. not only RLBOs) may solely be driven by the presence of 
RLBOs in the sample. However, when excluding the RLBOs, he finds the remaining BO-
backed IPOs to still be significantly less underpriced than NB equivalents, even though both 
samples should exhibit similar levels of asymmetric information.  
Schöber (2008) supplements the ex-ante uncertainty hypothesis by stating that BO-backed 
IPOs may exhibit lower levels of uncertainty than NB IPOs as the former are generally older 
and larger than the latter. This suggests firm age and - size is negatively related to the level of 
asymmetric information.  
 Certification by PE-sponsors  
Most research on certification by PE-sponsors are based on samples of VC-backed IPOs. 
Prior research postulate several reasons to why the presence of PE-sponsors in IPOs may have 
certifying effects in IPOs (analogous to the certification by underwriter reputation). First, in 
their study of the certification role of venture capitalists in IPOs, Barry et al. (1990) and 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) argue that VC-sponsors repeatedly interact with capital markets 
and thereby possess/develop superior expertise and experience in monitoring their 
investments. Second (and partly supporting the latter), Schöber (2008) suggests that VC-
sponsors may have stronger monitoring incentives than other owners, since VC-sponsors 
                                                          
15 Also called: The asymmetric information hypothesis. 
16 RLBOs: Assumed to be more transparent than non-RLBOSs as they exhibit prior trading history and thereby have been required to 
disclose certain information. 
28 
 
typically have larger equity shares at stake. Third, Barry et al. (1990) argue that VC-sponsors 
may be incentivised to maintain their reputation through accurate IPO pricing, as underpricing 
may also be costly to the VC firm and entrepreneurs. In summary, these arguments suggest 
the presence of owners with reputational capital at stake (in IPOs) may represent a 
trustworthy signal that the offer price reflects all relevant (inside) information. Consistent 
with this, Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Lee and Wahal (2004) find 
that underpricing tend to ameliorate with the quality of the VC-sponsor(s)17.  
On the other hand, Habib and Ljunqvist (2001) stress that one cannot infer that VC-sponsors 
have certifying effects in IPOs, simply based on the evidence provided by Barry et al. (1990) 
and Megginson and Weiss (1991). They argue that owners of VC-backed IPOs typically sell 
more shares in new issues (than owners of non-VC-backed IPOs) and thereby have greater 
incentives to reduce underpricing (see section 3.3.4). To the best of our knowledge, this 
proposition is not backed with empirical evidence. However, in his empirical study of BO-
backed IPOs, Schöber (2008) emphasise that he cannot provide sufficient empirical evidence 
supporting the certification hypothesis.  
 Sponsor-backed IPOs associated with “prestigious” underwriters  
Prior research documents that PE-backed firms tend to hire more reputable underwriters when 
going public, than NB firms (Barry et al. (1990), Megginson & Weiss (1991), Schöber 
(2008)). Furthermore, prior research find that underwriter reputation is negatively related to 
underpricing (see section 3.3.1). Hence, as noted by Schöber (2008), PE-backed IPOs may be 
less underpriced than other IPOs, simply because they employ more reputable underwriters 
than NB IPOs.  
 Participation rates: VC- and BO-backed IPOs 
Prior research indicates that VC- and BO- sponsors exhibit different selling behaviour when 
taking their investments public. Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that VC-sponsors on 
average contribute with 6.9% of total offered shares in IPOs. The corresponding number 
found by Lin and Smith (1998) was 4.2%. In contrast, Schöber (2008) finds that BO-sponsors 
on average contribute with 11.8% of all shares sold in their IPOs. Based on these findings, 
Schöber (2008) suggests that BO-sponsors may be “more aggressive sellers” when taking 
their portfolio firms public than VC-sponsors.  
                                                          
17 Proxies for monitoring skill/quality of VC-sponsors: Age, experience, number of previous IPOs, ownership share of the PE-sponsors. 
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4 Divestments by PE-sponsors: Theory and literature review  
There are several exit opportunities available to PE-sponsors, when they want to divest their 
portfolio firms. As depicted in Figure 4-1, the most common exit routes are i) taking the 
portfolio firm public (IPO), ii) sell it to an industrial player (trade sale), iii) sell it to a 
financial buyer, e.g. another PE-firm (secondary buyout), iv) sell it back to existing 
shareholders or management (buy-back) and v) full or partial write-down of firm value18 
(write-downs) (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003a).  
 
 
 
 
 
The chapter starts by presenting previous literature on factors affecting the choice of going 
public (both in general and for portfolio firms in particular), followed by theory and previous 
research related to choice of exit-routes by PE-sponsors. 
 Why do PE-sponsors take their portfolio firms public?  
In the following sections, we will first introduce the mechanics related to an IPO, followed by 
a discussion regarding the motivation for going public. Finally, we discuss potential reasons 
to why PE-sponsors in particular take their portfolio firms public.  
 The mechanics of IPOs 
The initial public offering (IPO) refers to the first time a company offers shares of its stock to 
the public (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). The shares offered can either be newly issued stocks 
(primary shares) or existing shares (secondary shares).  
A traditional IPO process contains underwriter(s) who manage the IPO deal and act as an 
intermediate between the issuing firm and the public market. In larger IPOs it is common to 
hire several underwriters, who together form a syndicate. One of the underwriters will then 
                                                          
18 Write-down: Least favourable option. May imply return to investors close to 100%. 
Portfolio firm 
IPO 
Secondary 
buyout 
Write-off Trade sale Buy-back 
Exit-routes 
Figure 4-1: Exit strategies by financial sponsors. Authors’ chart based on Cumming and MacIntosh (2003a) 
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act as the lead manager and advisor, while the rest of the syndicate contributes to the 
marketing- and selling of the shares (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). 
The role of underwriter(s) in an IPO process involves several steps and responsibilities. First, 
the lead underwriter (together with the IPO-firm) typically propose an indicative price range 
based on reasonable valuation techniques and analysis. Second, after the price range is 
determined, the issuing firm and its underwriter(s) commonly arrange road shows. The main 
objectives behind road shows are to promote the offer to potential buyers (e.g. usally high-net 
worth individuals or institutional investors) and justify the price range. Third, the underwriters 
often conduct a book building process in which they register allotment orders from interested 
investors (Berk & DeMarzo, 2014). Fourth, when approaching the IPO date, the underwriters 
typically estimate the total demand for the issue, and adjust the final offer price accordingly. 
The stocks are then allocated in line with each investor’s willingness to pay. Finally, the firm 
(normally) starts trading within a couple of days after the completion of the issuance process 
(Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). 
 Reasons to go public (in general)  
According to previous literature, the most common motivations for going public are:   
(i) Allow initial owners to diversify and “cash out” on their investment (increase liquidity). 
Pagano (1993) argues that firms go public when the diversification advantage for initial 
owners more than compensates the indirect- and direct costs of going public (e.g. underwriter 
fees, auditing and regulation requirements). 
(ii) Provide access to public capital markets and thereby finance future growth- and takeover 
activity (Brau & Fawcett, 2006). 
(iii) Reduce leverage and rebalance the capital structure (typically after periods of high 
growth) through IPO proceeds and subsequent SEOs (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). 
(iv) Strategic move (e.g. to increase firm publicity or reputation) (Brau & Fawcett, 2006). 
 Why PE firms take their portfolio firms public 
To the best of our knowledge, “Buyout-Backed Initial Public Offerings” by Schöber (2008) is 
the only empirical study investigating why PE-sponsors take their portfolio firms public. 
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More specifically, he studied 552 BO-backed IPOs19 and investigated four (complementing) 
potential reasons to why the firms were taken public: 
(i) Initiate the exit process: PE-sponsors (typically) represent the majority owner in their 
portfolio firms and thereby likely possess dominant influence in the IPO decision. Based on 
this, Schöber (2008) hypothesises that PE-sponsors take their portfolio firms public to initiate 
the divestment process. The exit process is initiated through sale of common shares and 
(potential) exercise of over-allotment options.  
(ii) Reduce leverage: As implied by the name, LBOs represent acquisitions characterised by 
substantial debt financing. Many firms continue to be highly leveraged after the LBO, which 
in turn may restrain the firm’s opportunity set (e.g. unable to fund positive NPV20 
investments) (Schöber, 2008). Schöber (2008) argues that using the proceeds from an IPO to 
repay debt, represents a method for firms to deleverage considerably.  
(iii) Enhance access to public capital markets: Private firms usually face higher financing 
costs (both debt and equity) than public firms, due to lower transparency. Furthermore, 
private firms often lack access to public bond markets due to absence of debt rating. Hence, 
limited access to capital markets may harm the financial flexibility of private firms.  
(iv) Finance- and facilitate acquisitions: Schöber (2008) postulates two reasons to why going 
public may contribute to financing of acquisitions. First, the issuer may use proceeds from the 
IPO (and subsequent SEOs) to finance takeovers. Second, listed firms can use their stocks as 
“acquisition currency”.  
(v) Other reasons: By examining IPO prospectuses Schöber (2008) identifies various other 
reasons for going public, although more vague than the four mentioned above. He finds that 
other reasons for going public may be increased company visibility, enhanced compensation 
programs for employees and to ensure long-term viability for customers and creditors. He 
does not test these reasons empirically, but discusses them in relation to prior research. 
Schöber (2008) investigates hypothesis i)-iv) through extensive analytical research, which 
resulted in two prominent findings. First, he finds that the principal motive PE-sponsors for 
taking their portfolio firm public is to initiate the exit. However, he emphasises that PE-
sponsors do not necessarily use IPOs for complete exits as they on average own 47% of the 
                                                          
19 Schöber’s BO sample consists of: Public-to-private, private-to-private, subsidiaries of public/private entities (i.e. not only reverse LBOs). 
20 Net Present Value (NPV). 
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equity stake post IPO. Concordantly, he finds that the exit process is typically completed 
through subsequent equity offers or sale of the firm.  Second, he finds that reduction of 
leverage represents an important motive for taking portfolio firms public. He documents that 
almost all BO-backed issuers use significant portions of the IPO proceeds to reduce leverage. 
More specifically, he finds that the average debt-asset ratio21 for the BO-backed firms falls 
from 64% to 38% following an IPO.   
 Choice of exit route 
As highlighted by Povaly (2006), exit strategies by PE-sponsors have attracted limited 
theoretical attention in academic research. To the best of our knowledge, there are no 
established theories on PE exits in particular. However, as noted by Povaly (2006), theory on 
asymmetric information can be used when explaining the motivation behind choice of exit 
route by PE-sponsors.  
 Asymmetric information  
The process of selling a portfolio firm to the public or to a private buyer, may be characterised 
by information being asymmetrically distributed between sellers (PE-sponsors and other 
owners) and the potential buyers (public equity market, industrial- or financial buyer). The 
PE-sponsors likely possess superior information about firm quality compared to the buyers, 
and may therefore be more capable of valuing the firm correctly. As noted by Cumming and 
MacIntosh (2003b), the degree of asymmetric information related to an exit may affect the 
buyers’ willingness to pay for the portfolio firm. The more severe informational asymmetries 
related to a transaction is, the larger discount may be required by the buyers. Hence, the 
buyers most capable to resolve informational asymmetries will likely place the most lucrative 
offers, provided that the information is positive. This reasoning suggests PE-sponsors sell 
their portfolio firms to the buyer most capable of overcoming informational barriers if the 
firm is of high quality (i.e. contain positive information) (Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003b).  
Cumming and MacIntosh (2003b) present a ranking related to preferred exit channels for 
firms characterised by high degrees of asymmetric information (see Figure 4-2). They 
hypothesise that IPO likely represents the exit-strategy associated with the greatest degree of 
asymmetric information as the buyers (public investors) are more dispersed and 
unsophisticated compared to buyers associated with other exit routes. It follows that each 
public investor may be incentivised to allow other investors to collect information about the 
                                                          
21 Book-values.  
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offer (free rider problem). In contrast, buyers in buy-backs, trade sales and secondary buyouts 
may represent more concentrated and professional buyers compared to public investors 
(Cumming & MacIntosh, 2003b). Sale to existing owners or management (buy-backs) is 
likely characterised by low degrees of asymmetric information as it is reasonable to assume 
existing owners/management and PE-sponsors possess similar knowledge regarding the 
internal state of the firm. However, information regarding valuation and market conditions 
may be asymmetrically distributed between PE-sponsors and managers/existing owners. For 
instance, some entrepreneurs may overestimate their own abilities and value of their own 
firm. 
 
 Literature review: Choice of exit route 
As highlighted by Povaly (2006) and Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), the majority of prior 
research on PE exits focuses on different aspects of IPO as an exit strategy. Furthermore, 
consensus in prior research appear to present IPO as the “preferred” exit route (as noted by 
Povaly (2006) and Jenkinson and Sousa (2015)). However, recent empirical evidence reveal 
that trade sale and secondary buyout represent the most common exit routes (at least in the 
European PE-market).  
Table 4-1 Frequency of exit route (by type) in Europe and the Nordic region (2014) 
The frequency of exit route by European and Nordic GPs (measured in numbers of exits).  
 
 
Europe 
 (EVCA, 2015a) 
Nordics 
 (Argentum Private Equity, 2014) 
Trade sale 26.5% 49.0% 
IPO 18.9% 7.0% 
Secondary BO 24.3% 22.0% 
Buy-backs 3.3% 7.0% 
Write-Off 7.2% 7.0% 
Other 19.8% 8.0% 
 
Buy-back Trade sale 
Secondary 
buyout 
IPO 
High Low Degree of asymmetric information 
Figure 4-2: Degree of asymmetric information between seller (PE-sponsor) and buyer of a portfolio firm at exit.  
Authors’ chart inspired by Cumming and MacIntosh (2003b) and Exhibit 60 by Povaly (2006) 
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Evidence from prior research suggests exit-route preferences differ between the North 
American- and European PE markets. In his qualitative analysis of PE exits, Povaly (2006) 
finds that European PE-sponsors prefer trade sale over other exit routes22. Supporting this, 
trade sale represented the most common exit route by European (and Nordic) PE-sponsors in 
2014 (see Table 4-1). In contrast, Cumming and MacIntoch (2003b) find that the frequency of 
IPO and trade sale as exit routes was equal in the US (both constituted 27% of all exits)23. 
Povaly (2006) suggests IPOs are less common in the European PE market compared to the US 
market, due to the former being characterised by less liquid public equity markets than the 
latter. However, the North American study by Cumming and MacIntoch (2003b) may be 
outdated for representative comparison to the European studies, as their sample covers exits 
between 1992 and 199524. 
In his comparison of trade sales and IPOs in the PE industry, Bienz (2004) documents higher 
rates of return for IPOs compared to trade sales25. However, he argues the result may be 
attributed to selection bias as highly profitable firms tend to be taken public, while less 
profitable firms more commonly are divested through trade sales. Supporting this, Cumming 
and MacIntosh (2003b) find that IPO represents the preferred exit route for high quality and - 
valued firms. 
A recent trend in the European PE industry, is the growth of secondary buyouts. In their study 
of 1022 European PE exits, Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) find that 44% of all exits between 
2000 and 2014 were secondary buyouts. The corresponding numbers for trade sales and IPOs 
were 42% and 14% respectively. They argue that secondary sales are gaining popularity as 
they are characterised by providing quick exit processes, certain proceeds and low risk of 
regulatory issues. Furthermore, they present evidence on several factors that appear to 
influence choice of exit route. First, they find that the choice between IPO and secondary 
buyout seem to depend crucially on the conditions in credit- and equity markets. IPO appears 
to be the preferred exit route when stock markets are strong, while secondary buyouts are 
more common when credit is easily accessible and cheap. Second, they find that firm 
characteristics appear to influence the choice between trade sales and secondary buyouts. 
Trade sales seem to represent a more common exit route than secondary buyouts, when the 
                                                          
22 Povaly’s research design: He conducted a qualitative study of European divestments by questioning 56 active European BO firms. 
23 Cumming and Macintoch (2003b) studied 35 VC-backed and 246 BO-backed exits in the US and Canada between 1992 and 1995, using a 
qualitative research approach (proprietary surveys).  
24 We were not able to retrieve more recent data on PE exits in North America. 
25 Bienz used data from CEPRES and compared 108 PE-backed IPOs to 423 trade sales (by PE firms). He found that the mean (median) 
internal rate of return was 123.4% (58.4%) for IPOs and 75.3% (18.3%) for trade sales. The result was within the 90% confidence interval 
(t=1.706).   
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portfolio firms are small and have exhibited strong growth. In summary, Jenkinson and Sousa 
(2015) find that PE-sponsors appear to take advantage of “windows of opportunities” in 
capital markets, and choose the exit route accordingly.  
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5 Methodology  
We employed different research approaches when i) comparing underpricing accross PE-
backed- and NB IPOs (empirical approach) and ii) examining the choice of exit route by PE-
sponsors and the interrelation between entry and exit (qualitative approach) (see Figure 5-1). 
 Matched control sample 
As noted by Schöber (2008), PE-backed IPOs contain certain characteristics (other than being 
backed by PE), which may affect initial returns. Potential sources of bias are offer size, firm 
size, industry, country and offer date (among others). Hence, in order to make inferences 
about the effect of PE-backing on underpricing, one should create a control sample that 
resembles the PE-backed sample along key dimensions assumed to affect initial returns. The 
ideal matching would involve comparing each PE-backed IPO with an identical IPO that did 
not receive PE backing. This allows for making causal conclusions related to the effects of 
PE-backing on IPO underpricing. Unfortunately, this is not feasible due to data limitations. In 
order to develop an appropriate matching procedure, one should therefore identify 
characteristics associated with PE-backed IPOs that interrelate with initial returns.  
The majority of empirical studies comparing underpricing across PE-backed- and NB IPOs 
have used a pair-matching procedure, i.e. they choose one control IPO for each PE-backed 
IPO (see Table 3-2). However, a drawback with pair-matching involves that the underpricing 
of the control IPO may be influenced by individual characteristics related to that specific 
Empirical approach Qualitative approach 
Research design 
Multivariate testing Univariate testing  
T-tests  
Non-parametric 
tests  
Multiple 
regressions 
In-depth interviews 
Figure 5-1: Methodology related to research design 
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offering (Schöber, 2008). Schöber (2008) attempts to overcome this weakness by creating a 
synthetic control IPO based on several resembling control IPOs (i.e. group-matching).  
Most matching procedures are, to different extents, based on industry, offer size and/or IPO 
date (see Table 3-2). This is due to; i) Initial returns seem to be influenced by industry, offer 
size and market timing (Ritter (1984), Barry et al. (1990), Hogan et al. (2001), Schöber 
(2008)) and ii) PE backed IPOs tend to be clustered in certain industries and have above-
average offer sizes than NB IPOs (Megginson & Weiss (1991), Schöber (2008)).  
 The authors’ matching procedure  
We employed a pair-matching procedure when creating a sample of control IPOs as limited 
sample size prevents identification of several resembling control IPOs (cf. Schöber’s (2008) 
group-matching). We based our matching procedure on industry classification and offer size, 
following consensus in prior research. Specifically, for each PE-backed IPO we selected a 
control IPO within the same ICB supersector26 with the (inflation-adjusted) offer size closest 
to the PE-backed IPO, as the matching firm. When we failed to identify a “match” within the 
same ICB supersector, we chose the most appropriate IPO within the same ICB industry, 
(partly) following Ritter’s (1991) matching methodology.  
However, a pair-matching procedure dismisses several observations due to exclusion of 
inappropriate matching partners. This may harm the statistical power of the empirical 
analysis, especially since our sample sizes are (somewhat) limited even prior to matching. 
Thus, we also compare the underpricing of PE-backed IPOs to the underpricing of the entire 
pool of control IPOs.  
 Calculation of initial returns  
As depicted in Table 3-1, different methodologies have been applied when estimating IPO 
underpricing. Some scholars use aftermarket prices a week or month after the first trading 
day, to avoid manipulation of initial returns caused by price stabilisation by underwriters27  
(Lowry, Officer, & Schwert, 2010)28. Lowry et al. (2010) argue that using monthly (as 
opposed to daily) initial returns increase the probability that the aftermarket price captures the 
true stock value.  
                                                          
26 Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is an industry classification system. It consists of 10 industries, 19 supersectors, 41 sectors and 
114 subsector. 
27 Price stabilisation: The process in which underwriters stabilise/manipulate the stock price during the first period following the IPO. The 
underwriters are often granted an (over-allotment) option, which typically allows them to issue up to 15% additional shares.   
28 Aftermarket prices one week/month after the offering are especially common in older studies, possibly due to data limitations.  
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However, the majority of recent research uses prices quoted on the first trading day as the 
aftermarket price (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2003), Loughran & Ritter (2004), Schöber (2008), 
Vong & Zhao (2008), Hahn et al. (2013)) (see Table 3-1). Supporting this, McGuiness(1992) 
documents that most of IPO underpricing vanishes after the first trading day29. Following his 
research and consensus in recent literature, we used the first day closing price as proxy for the 
true aftermarket stock price.  
Beatty and Ritter (1986) argue that adjusting initial returns for market returns (based on a 
benchmark such as a stock market index) is unnecessary since market returns are typically 
very small compared to (mean) initial returns. In addition, some scholars favour using market 
prices (i.e. trades) while others use bid prices or the mean between the bid- and ask prices, 
when computing initial returns (Schöber, 2008) (See Table 3-1 and Table 3-2).  
Consistent with the methodology applied in recent research, we define the initial return as the 
percentage change from the offer price to the unadjusted closing price on the first trading day. 
The initial returns are therefore neither adjusted for market (index) returns nor adjusted 
backwards for possible stock splits and/or dividends. 
(1) 𝐼𝑅𝑖 =
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,1−𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,0
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,0
 
We used both equally-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) returns, when comparing the 
degree of underpricing across PE-backed- and NB IPOs. We employed inflation-adjusted 
offer sizes as weights when calculating VW returns, which allowed for analysis of the 
relationship between offer size and initial returns.  
The EW return of sample s (𝐼𝑅𝑠
𝐸𝑊) was calculated using the following formula:  
(2)  𝐼𝑅𝑠
𝐸𝑊 =
1
𝑛𝑠
∑  𝐼𝑅𝑖
𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1  
where 𝑛𝑠 refers to the number of observations in sample s.  
The VW return of sample s (𝐼𝑅𝑠
𝑉𝑊) was calculated using the following formula:  
 (3) 𝐼𝑅𝑠
𝑉𝑊 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖  ×  𝐼𝑅𝑖
𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1  
𝑤𝑖 =
𝑂𝑆𝑖
∑ 𝑂𝑆𝑖  
𝑛𝑠
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑤𝑖 represents the weight associated with offer size of firm i. 
                                                          
29 McGuiness (1992): Tests IPO underpricing using different holding-periods.  
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We adjusted the offer sizes (local currency) for effects of country specific inflation by 
utilising a time-varying GDP deflator30. The offer sizes were aligned to the base year of 2005. 
However, the effect of the deflation was relatively small in this sample, due to low inflation 
and limited time-period.  
(4) 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 (2005) =
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
1+(
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟−𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟2005
𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟2005
)
 
 
To eliminate currency risk we converted all deflated offer sizes to a common currency; 
namely the USD (see section 6.2).  
 Distribution characteristics- and trimming of initial returns 
We trimmed our samples for severe outliers to improve distribution properties and align the 
distributions of the PE- and control samples (to enhance the validity of the empirical testing). 
The untrimmed control samples encompassed some extreme values, with returns ranging from 
-19.2% to 119.3% see Table 10-3, Appendix). Furthermore, the means of untrimmed control 
samples severely exceeds the medians, indicating non-normal distributions (see Table 10-3, 
Appendix). Shapiro-Wilk tests confirmed the non-normality of returns related to these 
samples. We therefore removed approximately 2% of the most extreme values (in each 
direction) from the total-control sample, and adjusted the matched sample accordingly (i.e. 
did not include extreme observations as matching partners). Comparison of untrimmed- and 
trimmed distribution plots and characteristics reveal substantial improvements to the 
distribution properties post trimming (e.g. substantially lower skewness and kurtosis) 31. 
In contrast, the untrimmed PE sample appeared to be approximately normally distributed and 
not distorted by extreme values (see Figure 10-1and Table 10-3, Appendix). A Shapiro-Wilk 
test verifies the normality of its distribution. We therefore refrained from trimming the PE 
sample (and its matched control sample) when employing EW returns, as we deemed the 
balance between distribution characteristics and statistical power satisfactory. However, we 
decided to remove the 2% most extreme values when comparing the PE sample to the total-
control sample, to maintain methodical consistency (and as the larger control sample allows 
for trimming without severely harming the statistical power).  
                                                          
30 GDP deflator = ratio of GDP in local currency to GDP in constant local currency (Worldbank). 
31 See Table 5-1 and Figure 5-2 B and C (trimmed) and Table 10-3 and Figure 10-1 B and C (untrimmed) in Appendix. 
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Despite our attempts of smoothing and aligning the distributions of the PE- and control 
samples, the trimmed control samples still appear to suffer from moderate non-normality (see 
Table 5-1 and Figure 5-2 B, C). More trimming would smooth the distributions further, but 
may in turn harm the statistical power of the results. Due to limited sample sizes, we therefore 
refrained from further trimming of our samples. 
Table 5-1: Distribution characteristics of initial returns (trimmed samples) 
The table summarises key characteristics related to the distribution of the (unadjusted) initial returns. Skewness measures whether the 
initial returns are symmetrically distributed to the left and right of the mean. Kurtosis measures the thickness of the tails of the 
distribution. The kurtosis of the normal distribution is 3.  
 
 Obs. Mean Median Min Max Std. Skewness Kurtosis 
PE-backed 58 2.942% 2.119% -17.105% 20.690% 7.137% 0.196 0.378 
 
NB (matched-
control) 
60 7.121% 2.986% -19.167% 72.727% 15.286% 2.337 7.084 
 
NB (total-
contol) 
151 6.664% 2.593% -13.333% 72.727% 13.916% 2.499 7.831 
 
 
Exhibit A: PE sample Exhibit B: Matched-control sample Exhibit C: Total-control sample 
   
Figure 5-2: The Kernel density distribution of the initial returns together with the normal density distribution 
It is worth mentioning that when estimating VW returns, we excluded Renewable Energy 
Corporation (REC) and ISS from the PE sample (and their matched partners). This because 
their abnormally large offer sizes (weight 10% and 12% respectively) and underpricing 
(23.6% and 14.2% respectively) had considerable effects on sample means (see Table 10-4 in 
Appendix).  
Distribution characteristics of EW- and VW returns related to (trimmed) PE-backed- and NB 
samples are summarised in section 10.2.3 in Appendix.  
 Univariate testing: T-tests and non-parametric equivalents  
The majority of prior research on underpricing have employed either t-tests or non-parametric 
counterparts, when whether the level of underpricing differs across PE- and NB IPOs. Non-
parametric tests do not require assumptions regarding the sample distribution, but often at the 
expense of lower statistical power (Ball & Whitley , 2002). The t-tests generally offer higher 
Residuals Residuals Residuals 
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statistical power, but “in turn” requires normally distributed variables. However, the t-tests are 
valid when samples are “sufficiently” large32, as the central limit theorem enables relaxation 
of the distribution requirements (Siegrist, 2015). Based on our sample sizes, we therefore 
deem the t-tests as valid and assess the robustness of the results by complementing with non-
parametric equivalents.   
 T-tests – EW initial returns  
As depicted in Table 5-2, we employed student t-statistics when testing the means- and 
differences in means, using EW returns. Welch’s t-test is an adaption of the student t-test and 
is appropriate when testing for differences in means between two samples assumed to have 
unequal variances and sample sizes33 (Welch, 1938).  
 T-tests – VW initial returns  
Table 5-3 presents the appropriate t-statistics when sample values are given unequal weights 
(and have unequal variances), following Goldberg, Kercheval and Kiseop’s methodology 
(2005). The calculation of the alphas (α) in the denominator of the t-statistic implies the 
variance of values with large weights (i.e. large wi) is emphasised more than the variance of 
those with smaller wi. In contrast, when calculating the t-statistic for EW returns, the 
variances are weighted equally (i.e. w=1/ni, where ni= size of sample i). The t-statistics in 
Table 5-3 is approximated with a t-distribution with df degrees of freedom. We verified the 
methodology through consultation with Jostein Lillestøl, a professor at NHH with statistical 
modelling, time-series and risk analysis representing his main research areas.  
 
                                                          
32 Rule of thumb: Greater than 30 observations (Siegrist, 2015).  
33 Statistical tests revealed the variances of the PE-returns and total-control-returns were unequal.  
Table 5-2: T-tests using EW initial returns  (Keller, 2009)   
0,8 
Two samples 
(differences in means) 
One sample  
(H0: mean=0, Ha: mean > 0) 
 
Paired t-test 
(matched pairs) 
Welch’s t-test 
(independent samples, unequal 
variances) 
Student t-test 
Test-
statistic 
𝑡 =
?̅?𝐷
𝑆𝐷 ∗ √
1
𝑛𝐷
 
𝑡 =
?̅?1 − ?̅?2
√(
𝑠1
2
𝑛1
+
𝑠2
2
𝑛2
)
 
𝑡 =
𝑋𝑖̅̅̅
𝑠 ∗ √
1
𝑛𝑖
 
Mean and 
std  
?̅?𝐷= difference in mean IR between 
sample 1 and 2 
𝑆𝐷= std. of differences in IR 
𝑛𝐷= number of matched pairs 
?̅?𝑖= mean IR for sample I (i=1,2) 
𝑠𝑖= std. of IR of sample i  
𝑛𝑖= number of observations in sample i 
 
𝑋𝑖̅̅̅ = mean IR for sample i 
Si = std. of IR for sample i 
ni= number of observations in 
sample i 
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 Non-parametric tests   
To assess the robustness of our results, we performed non-parametric equivalents of the two-
sample t-tests (see Table 5-4). 
Table 5-4: Non-parametric tests (Keller, 2009) 
 
Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test 
(matched pairs) 
Wilcoxon rank sum test 
(independent samples) 
Test-statistic 𝑧 =
𝑇 − 𝐸(𝑇)
𝜎𝑇
 𝑧 =
𝑇 − 𝐸(𝑇)
𝜎𝑇
 
Mean [E(T) and 
std [𝜎𝑇] 
𝐸(𝑇) =
𝑛(𝑛 + 1)
4
      𝜎𝑇 = √
𝑛(𝑛 + 1)(2𝑛 + 1)
24
 
T=rank sum of sample 1 
𝐸(𝑇) =
𝑛1(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 1)
2
    𝜎𝑇=√
𝑛1𝑛2(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 1)
12
 
T=rank sum of sample 1 
   
 Multivariate testing: Regressions 
We performed multivariate regressions in an attempt to isolate the effect of PE-sponsors on 
underpricing, from other determinants of initial returns such as aftermarket volatility, 
industry, market timing and national business cycles. The regressions allow us to exploit more 
observations compared to paired testing, as the matching procedure is unnecessary. This is 
beneficial for the statistical power. We included 59 PE-backed IPOs and 154 NB IPOs in our 
regression analysis, representing the firms we were able to identify the lead underwriter for.  
We ran the following regressions (with estimated standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity35):  
 (1)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐾 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑂 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐼 + 𝛽909 + 𝛽910 +  𝜀 
(2)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼2 + 𝛾1𝑉𝐶 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑂 + ⋯ +  𝛽910 + 𝜔 
(3)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼3 + 𝛾1𝑉𝐶 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑂 + ⋯ 𝛽5𝑆𝑇𝐷 + ⋯ + 𝛽910 + 𝜖  
(4)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼4 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠 + ⋯ + 𝛽910 +  𝜑 
                                                          
34 𝑋𝑖, 𝑋𝑗 denotes the initial return of firm i and j respectively.  
35 See section 10.4 in Appendix for evaluation of model assumptions and diagnostics.  
Table 5-3: T-tests using VW initial returns 
 Two samples  
(differences in means, unequal variances) 
One sample 
(H0: mean=0, Ha: mean > 0) 
Test-
statistic 
t = 
?̅?1−?̅?2
√?̂?1+?̂?2
 t = 
?̅?
√?̂?
 
Mean34 
(?̅?1, ?̅?2) 
?̅?1 = ∑ (𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) where i=1,2,… n 
?̅?2 = ∑ (𝑤𝑗 ∗ 𝑋𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1 , where j=1,2,… m 
?̅? = ∑ (𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) where i=1,2,… n 
 
Std  
𝑺𝟏 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?1)
2𝑛
𝑖=1   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑺𝟐 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗(𝑋𝑗 − ?̅?2)
2𝑚
𝑗=1  
?̂?𝟏 =
𝑆1
𝑛−1
  and ?̂?𝟐 =
𝑆2
𝑚−1
 
𝑺 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?1)
2𝑛
𝑖=1   
?̂? =
𝑆1
𝑛
 
Degrees of 
freedom  
𝒅𝒇 =
(?̂?1 + ?̂?2)
2
?̂?1
2
𝑛 − 1 +
?̂?2
2
𝑚 − 1
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i) “IRi” represents the initial return of firm i 
ii)  “PE” is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was PE-backed, zero otherwise 
iii) “VC” (“BO”) is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm was VC (BO) backed, 
zero otherwise 
iv) “PRESTund” is dummy variable equal to one if a “prestigious” underwriter was 
utilised, zero otherwise 
v) PRESTspons is dummy variable equal to one if a “prestigious” PE-sponsor was 
utilised, zero otherwise 
vi) “lnOS” is the natural logarithm of the (inflation-adjusted) offer size, following the 
methodology applied in previous literature (Ang & Brau (2002), Schöber (2008)) 
vii) “HIGHTECH” is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to ICB 
industry “Technology” or “Telecommunications”, zero otherwise 
viii) “DK”, “NO” and “FI” represent market dummy variables for Denmark, Norway 
and Finland respectively. Hence, Sweden represents the reference category (i.e. 
when NO, DK and FI all are equal to zero) 
ix) “STD” is the standard deviation of daily returns over 19 days, beginning the day 
after the IPO date (i.e. day 2 -20)  
Aftermarket volatility (“STD”) has been extensively used in prior research as a proxy for the 
degree of ex-ante uncertainty and asymmetric information related to an IPO (Ritter (1987), 
Barry et al. (1990), Ainina and Mohan (1991), Ang and Brau (2002)). As argued by Ritter 
(1987), firms with high aftermarket volatility is likely to have uncertain values before the 
IPO. The aftermarket volatility of an issue is usually defined as the standard deviation of daily 
returns from day 2 to day 20 post IPO (Ritter (1987), Barry et al. (1990), Ainina & Mohan 
(1991), Ang & Brau (2002)). Hence, following these studies we utilise “STD” as a proxy for 
ex-ante uncertainty and asymmetric information. 
However, some studies document that aftermarket volatility is affected by (the expectancy of) 
price stabilisation activities by underwriters36 (Hanley, Kumar, & Seguin (1993), Ruud 
(1993)). To illustrate, Hanley et al. (1993) found evidence suggesting issues associated with 
(the expectance of) price stabilisation tend to exhibit lower aftermarket volatility 10-15 days 
                                                          
36 Price stabilisation: The process in which underwriters stabilise/manipulate the stock price during the first period following the IPO. The 
underwriters are often granted an (over-allotment) option, which typically allows them to issue up to 15% additional shares.   
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following the IPO. Hence, we acknowledge that “STD” in some cases may not capture the 
“true” aftermarket volatility as it may be affected by price stabilisation by underwriters.  
Offer size and high-tech industries also represent proxies for the levels of ex-ante uncertainty 
and asymmetric information related to an issue (Schöber (2008)). As noted by Schöber 
(2008), small firms in high-tech industries tend to be characterised by greater uncertainty 
regarding firm value (and thereby risk), than larger firms in other industries.   
 “PE” (“PRESTspons”) and “PRESTund” are included to capture the (potential) certification 
effect by PE-sponsors (“prestigious” PE-sponsors) and “prestigious” underwriters, 
respectively. The scoring procedures applied when determining whether an underwriter/PE-
sponsor is considered “prestigious” or not, are described in section 10.3 in Appendix. The 
country-specific dummy variables are included to control for potential effects (on initial 
returns) by national business cycles and - market characteristics.  
Certain assumptions regarding the residuals must be satisfied in order to make valid 
inferences based on the regression results. We have evaluated the model assumptions and 
diagnostics in section 10.4 in Appendix.  
 Qualitative approach: In-depth interviews  
Through in-depth interviews with players in the Nordic PE-industry, we aimed to identify key 
drivers behind choice of exit strategies, elaborate on how entry and exit of portfolio firms may 
represent interrelated events, identify prominent trends in the PE industry going forward and 
discuss our empirical results with experienced industry players.  
Our respondents have vast experience from the PE industry representing partners from the 
renowned Nordic PE firms; Altor, EQT, Herkules Capital, FSN Capital and HitechVision. 
More precisely, we spoke to one deputy CEO, one former CEO (now chairman and partner) 
and three partners (one is also the head of the Norwegian subsidiary) of Nordic PE firms in 
addition to one industry-expert with experience from Acquisition Finance (i.e. acquisitions 
related to LBOs). Some of our respondents preferred to remain anonymous in the analysis 
(but were comfortable with being listed as references in the bibliography, see References in 
Chapter 9) We therefore refer to our interview respondents as Respondent 1 (R1), R2 … R6 in 
our analysis. However, we do not deem this as a limitation to our study as revealing their 
identity is of no value to our analysis. The interviews were conducted in November 2015 
through personal meetings and telephone calls.  
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We based the development of interview questions/themes on Povaly’s (2006) qualitative 
study of PE exits and Schöber’s (2008) empirical study of IPO as an exit strategy. However, 
Pavlov’s (2006) questions were generally characterised by being closed-ended37, while we 
aimed to ask more open and non-leading questions to encourage our respondents to answer 
freely.  
  
                                                          
37 Closed-ended questions: Questions that limit the respondents with a list of answer choices 
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6 Sample selection and data collection 
 Sample identification 
The underpricing analysis required two samples; one sample of PE-backed IPOs and one 
control sample of NB IPOs.  
The overall sample of IPOs consisted of companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), 
Nasdaq OMX Nordic38 in addition to Oslo Axess and the Nasdaq First Norths. The latter 
typically serves as stock exchanges for younger and smaller companies compared to the Main 
Lists. There are mainly three reasons behind our choice of geographical area. First, there are 
few academic studies examining the underpricing phenomenon related to listings on Nordic 
exchanges (see Table 3-1). Second, there is limited research on differences in underpricing 
between PE- and NB IPOs listed on these exchanges (see Table 3-2). Third, the Nordic 
markets are characterised by being relatively transparent with respect to data availability 
(Pukthuanthong et al., 2013).  
In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample, we selected a time-frame of 10 years. We 
thereby restricted our sample to firms listed between January 2005 and December 2014.   
The first step of the data gathering process involved identifying all IPOs listed on Nordic 
exchanges between January 2005 and December 2014. We obtained relevant IPOs from OSE 
and Oslo Axess between 2005 and 2014 from OSE’s website. However, such information was 
only available post 2010 for the Nasdaq OMX Nordic and the First Norths. Fortunately, Ulf 
Persson, Economic and Statistical researcher at Nasdaq OMX Nordic, was kind to provide us 
with the lacking IPOs listed prior to 2010.  
Furthermore, to make our sample more suitable for analytical purposes, we excluded IPOs 
with the following characteristics:  
 IPOs without prospectus available 
 “Ambiguous” IPO deals (e.g. An equity carve-out, i.e. where the IPO- firm in question is 
a result of a demerger from a public traded company) 
 Close-end funds, Special Purpose Entity, Specified Purpose Acquisition, bonds, trusts 
(e.g. Nordea Investment Funds - actively managed ETFs)  
                                                          
38 Nasdaq OMX Nordics consists of: Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE), Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE) and Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(HSE). 
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After excluding IPOs characterised by the criteria listed above, our final dataset consisted of 
215 IPOs.  
 Identification of PE-backed IPOs  
A time-consuming, but important part of the data gathering process, involved identifying the 
IPOs that were backed by PE-sponsors. We retrieved lists of PE- backed IPOs from the 
Argentum PE database, Bloomberg and Carnegie Investment Bank, which we exploited in the 
identification process.  
Unfortunately, one cannot naively rely on the Argentum database and other retrieved samples, 
due to lack of transparency in the PE market. In other words, such samples do not necessarily 
include all relevant PE-backed IPOs. We therefore cross-referenced the samples with 
additional sources, such as desktop searches, previous research, IPO prospectuses and 
correspondence with industry players. We also excluded PE-backed IPOs with unavailable 
IPO prospectuses.   
Overall, we ended up with a sample of 60 PE-backed IPOs 
 Classification of VC- and BO- backed IPOs    
In this paper, the term “PE-backed firms” encompasses both VC- and BO-backed firms, while 
the term “PE-sponsor” refers to both VC- and BO-sponsors collectively. However, we 
distinguish between VC and BO for analytical purposes.  
We separated the pool of PE-backed firms into two main categories, namely; VC-backed 
firms and BO- backed firms.  VC firms are characterised by being young and relatively risky 
entrepreneurial ventures (Barry C. et al., 1990). VC includes both early stage (seed) ventures 
and expansion (growth) ventures (Argentum Private Equity, 2015a). BO-backed firms, on the 
other hand, are typically characterised by being relatively mature, delivering steady cash 
flows and having substantial assets (Schöber, 2008). The BO classification encompasses both 
public-to-private and private-to-private LBOs, in addition to subsidiaries of private and public 
firms (Schöber, 2008).  
Our sample includes all types of BO backing, i.e. public-to-private, private-to-private and 
subsidiaries of public and private firms. This represents an extension of most previous 
research on BO-backing, which mainly focus on reverse LBOs (see Table 3-2). It is worth 
noting that the boundaries between VC- and BO- backed firms are often blurred, as both PE 
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types may contain the others’ “typical” characteristics. This makes the classification process 
somewhat challenging as one cannot simply follow certain rules when classifying the pool of 
PE-backed firms.  
We distinguished between VC and BO (mainly) based on the classification defined in 
Argentum’s database for PE-backed firms. Additionally, we both verified and attempted to 
improve Argentum’s classification through information expressed in news-articles and press-
releases, on the homepages of relevant industry players and in IPO prospectuses. We also 
turned to these sources when classifying entities not identified in Argentum’s database.  
In summary, the classification process resulted in 25 VC-backed- and 35 BO- backed IPOs 
(see Table 6-1) 
 Data collection: Firm specific characteristics 
Certain company specific information was required to conduct the matching procedure and 
underpricing analysis. Relevant information related to the matching procedure included; i) 
The ICB industry code and ICB supersector for each IPO-firm39, which were extracted from 
the Thomson Reuters DataStream and ii) offer price and shares issued (to calculate offer 
sizes). Relevant information related to the underpricing analysis encompassed; i) Offer price, 
ii) aftermarket stock price, iii) lead underwriter, iv) standard deviation of daily returns over 19 
days post the IPO date v) participation rates by PE-sponsors (i.e. the share retention by 
owners in the IPO) and vi) pre-equity stakes and firm age related to PE-sponsors (for 
determining the “prestige” related to PE-sponsors).  
Offer prices were obtained through the following sources: i) Offer prices related to Norwegian 
IPOs were available at OSE’s website. Similarly, we obtained offer prices from CSE from its 
website. ii) Offer prices related to listings on the remaining exchanges proved more 
challenging to obtain. Fortunately, we were lucky to receive most offer prices from listings on 
SSE, HSE and their respective First Norths between 2010 and 2015 from Ulf Persson. iii) 
Finally, we obtained the lacking offer prices from listings on SSE, HSE and First Norths 
through Bloomberg, desktop searches for news articles and press releases.  
Closing prices proved easier to obtain than the offer prices. The majority of closing prices for 
companies listed in Sweden, Denmark and Finland were obtained through manual searches on 
                                                          
39 Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is an industry classification system. It consists of 10 industries, 19 supersectors, 41 sectors and 
114 subsectors.  
49 
 
the Nasdaq OMX Nordic website, Yahoo Finance and Bloomberg. The closing prices for 
IPOs on OSE were not available online. However, Truls Evensen, statistical manager at the 
OSE, was kind enough to provide us with lacking closing prices.  
Daily returns during the 19 days following the IPO (i.e. date 2-20) were calculated based on 
daily stock prices extracted from Thomson Reuters DataStream (main source), supplemented 
by stock quotes from Bloomberg and Yahoo Finance when necessary.  
Calculation of offer size required information about the number of shares issued in each IPO 
(in addition to offer prices). For IPOs listed in Norway, we obtained the number of primary 
and secondary shares issued for each IPO from OSE’s website. However, the other Nordic 
exchanges do not publish such information. The lacking data was therefore obtained through 
extensive desktop work, mail correspondence with relevant firms and help from Ulf Persson. 
We verified our findings with information regarding offer size expressed in IPO prospectuses. 
Finally, it is worth noting that we excluded over-allotment options, regardless of whether they 
were exercised or not.   
The most time-consuming part of the data gathering process was obtaining the IPO 
prospectuses. These were identified through extensive manual desktop work in addition to 
mail-correspondence and conversations with relevant firms. Additionally, we were lucky to 
receive lacking prospectuses for IPOs listed in Norway from Truls Evensen. In total, we 
managed to gather 215 prospectuses, which defined our final dataset of IPOs.   
In order to eliminate currency risk, we converted all (inflation-adjusted) offer sizes to a 
common currency; namely the USD. The IPOs were originally quoted in either NOK, SEK, 
DKK or EUR. The conversion was conducted by extracting daily exchange rates from the 
central bank of Norway (Norges Bank).  
 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6-1 presents the frequency of PE-backed- and NB IPOs by geographical area. During 
the relevant time-period, Norway was the most active market in terms of VC-backed IPOs, 
while the majority of BO-backed IPOs took place in Sweden. The most active PE firms were 
EQT (7), Nordic Capital (5), Northzone (4), HitechVision (3) and NorgesInvestor (3).  
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Table 6-2 reports the frequency of PE-backed- and NB IPOs by year. In summary, the IPO 
activity of PE-backed and NB IPOs appear to be relatively similar; Years associated with high 
IPO activity among control firms seems to also be characterised many PE-backed IPOs and 
vice versa. Most IPOs took place between 2005 and 2007, while the IPO activity in the 
subsequent years appeared adversely affected by the financial crisis. In fact, there were no 
PE-backed IPOs in 2008 and 2009 in our sample. However, the IPO activity appears to have 
picked up over the last couple of years.   
Table 6-2: Sample distribution by IPO year 
 
IPO year VC-backed BO-backed Total-control  Total 
2005 7 6 18 31 
2006 4 7 16 27 
2007 7 4 38 49 
2008 - - 9 9 
2009 - - 3 3 
2010 3 5 11 19 
2011 1 1 10 12 
2012 - - 2 2 
2013 2 3 16 21 
2014 1 9 32 42 
Total 25 35 155 215 
     
Table 6-3 presents the concentration of the PE-backed sample and the control sample (non-
matched) in certain industries. The IPOs in the control sample appear to be somewhat 
dispersedly distributed across several industries, with telecommunications and utilities as 
exceptions. The prominent exposure to natural resources by firms listed in Norway, likely 
explains the high frequency of IPOs related to the oil and gas sector. In contrast, both VC-
backed and BO-backed IPOs appear to be notably more clustered in certain industries 
compared to NB IPOs. The majority of VC-backed IPOs were concentrated in health care and 
technology, while industrials, consumer goods and – services represent the most frequent 
industries for BO-backed IPOs. An apparent distinction between PE-backed and NB IPOs, is 
the low frequency of PE-backed IPOs originating from the financial sector. This can likely be 
explained by the fact that fund agreements are subject to investment constraints, which often 
prohibit GPs from acquiring financial firms. 
Table 6-1: Sample distribution by country 
 
Market VC BO Total-control Total 
Denmark 4 5 15 9 
Finland 1 2 6 3 
Norway 13 13 91 26 
Sweden 7 15 42 22 
Total 25 35 155 215 
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Table 6-3: Sample distribution by industry 
     
ICB Industry VC-backed BO-backed Total control  Total 
0001 Oil and Gas 5 1 37 43 
1000 Basic Materials 1 2 11 14 
2000 Industrials 2 12 27 41 
3000 Consumer Goods 1 7 14 22 
4000 Health Care 10 3 16 29 
5000 Consumer Services - 7 8 15 
6000 Telecommunications - 1 1 2 
7000 Utilities   1 1 
8000 Financials - 1 28 29 
9000 Technology 6 1 12 19 
Total 25 35 155 215 
     
Table 6-4 summarises key descriptive statistics for the VC-backed, BO-backed and the total-
control sample. We find that PE-backed IPOs are associated with more reputable underwriters 
than NB IPOs. Furthermore, mean offer sizes differ considerably between the three IPO types, 
despite our attempt to match firms as closely as possible by offer size. In line with previous 
research, the mean offer size of BO-backed IPOs is significantly greater than NB IPOs40 
(Ainina & Mohan (1991), Bergström et al. (2006), Schöber (2008), Cao & Lerner (2009)).  In 
contrast, the mean offer size of VC-backed IPOs was not significantly different from control 
IPOs. Finally, BO-backed IPOs seem to be associated with longer private ownership periods 
and more reputable PE-sponsors than VC-backed IPOs. 
 Table 6-4: Key descriptive statistics 
 
 
Offer size 
(inflation-adj, USD 
1000) 
Use of prestigious 
underwriters41 
Use of prestigious 
GPs42 
Private ownership 
period (under PE) 
PE-backed IPOs 183 084.3 51.67% 36.67% 5.2  
 VC-backed 
 BO-backed 
81 338.2 
255 760.1 
36.00% 
62.86% 
4.00% 
60.00% 
4.2 
5.8  
NB IPOs (total-control) 90 807.7 26.45%  - 
PE- backed minus NB 
IPOs (total-control) 
92 276.6** 
(t-stat: 2.1728) 
25.22%43*** 
(t-stat: 3.4013) 
 - 
Total IPO sample 116 559.3 33.49%  - 
 
                                                          
40 Mean offer size BO vs total-control: The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat= 2.706, P-value=0.51%). 
41 Prestigious underwriter: We developed a scoring procedure based on i) Nordic underwriter ranking by TNS Sifo and ii) the international 
underwriter ranking by Dealogic & WSJ Investment Banking Scorecard (see section 10.3.1 in Appendix). 
42 Prestigious GP: We developed a scoring procedure based on an overall assessment of the following four variables: i) Age of the GP, ii) nr. 
of IPOs associated with the GP, iii) average offer size associated with the IPOs, iv) average pre-equity stake held by the GP. The GP’s were 
given a score on each criteria. A GP was ranked as “prestigious” if it obtained a total score of 3 or 4. 
43Prestigious underwriters: The difference is statistically significant at the 1%-level (T-stat = 3.401, P-value=0.0005). 
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 Potential biases 
 Outliers 
Outliers refer to observations that deviate extremely from other values in a sample (NIST, 
2012). If outliers are biased in one direction, they can potentially lead to considerable 
distortion of means. Hence, adjusting a sample for outliers may make the means more 
informative, but potentially at the expense of lower statistical power. In relation to the EW 
returns, we account for outliers in the PE- and total-control sample by removing 
approximately 2% most extreme observations in each direction. For the matched-control 
sample, we account for outliers by not including firms with distortive effects as matching 
partners. We considered the trimming sufficient to achieve satisfactory distribution properties, 
without severely harming the statistical power (see section 5.3). 
When estimating VW returns, we excluded Renewable Energy Corporation (REC) and ISS 
from the PE sample (and their matched partners), as abnormally large offer sizes (weight 10% 
and 12% respectively) and underpricing (23.6% and 14.2% respectively) had considerable 
effect on the sample means.  
 Selection bias 
One limitation to our analysis is the risk of selection bias in the sample selection process. 
Selection bias may arise when members of the target population is excluded from the sample 
due to the nature of the sampling process (Keller, 2009). This may in turn distort the validity 
of the inference, as sample characteristics may deviate from those of the actual population.  
We have elaborated on two potential selection biases. First, the PE sample may become 
biased towards large, profiled IPOs backed by renowned PE-sponsors, as there is typically 
more information available about such IPOs compared to smaller, less profiled IPOs. Thus, 
when identifying PE-backed IPOs we used- and cross-checked several sources (Argentum, 
Bloomberg, Carnegie Investment Bank, extensive desktop work, correspondence with 
industry players) in order to avoid selection bias. Despite our thorough work in identifying 
relevant PE-backed IPOs, we acknowledge there is still risk our sample excludes relevant 
observations.   
Second, in relation to the underpricing analysis, we found it challenging to identify final offer 
prices, closing prices and issue sizes, mainly due to lack of post-IPO reporting. This may also 
distort the sample towards larger, more profiled IPOs as these typically exhibit greater 
transparency than smaller, less profiled IPOs.   
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 Omitted variable bias 
Omitted variable bias (OVB) arises when a regression model leaves out a relevant variable 
(β1≠0) that correlates with at least one of the included variables (cov(x1,x2) ≠0)44 (Hopland, 
2015).  OVB implies OLS45 no longer provides unbiased estimators, which in turn may 
invalidate the inference. We have attempted to avoid OVB by including all variables deemed 
relevant in prior research on underpricing and by estimating several regressions. First, we 
started by estimating a regression with few explanatory variables and added new variables 
(one-by-one) while carefully watching the behaviour of the variables and the adjusted R-
squared. Second, we controlled for potential non-linear relationships by log-transforming 
offer sizes and including quadratic terms. Finally, we tested whether the effect of one variable 
(e.g. PE-backing) depends on another (e.g. offer size), by estimating the regressions with 
interaction terms. Based on the precautions mentioned above, we believe our results do not 
suffer from severe OVB.  
 Measurement errors  
Measurement errors arise when the observed variable does not perfectly capture the true 
variable (Hopland, 2015). Measurement errors may generate biased estimators and thereby 
harm the validity of the inference. We acknowledge that measurement errors may be present 
in our empirical testing. To illustrate, the ranking procedures applied when measuring 
underwriter/PE-sponsor “prestige” may not perfectly reflect the true quality of the 
underwriter/PE-sponsor. We therefore take into account the risk of measurement errors when 
interpreting the coefficients, in particular when interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients.  
 Source inconsistency 
Finally, it is worth noting that our dataset is created based on numerous different sources (e.g. 
Argentum, Bloomberg, Carnegie Investment Bank, correspondence with industry players, 
desktop research, news articles, etc.). When comparing and cross-checking the information 
obtained from the different sources, we occasionally discovered minor variations related to 
the information presented. We therefore acknowledge that the input applied in our statistical 
testing procedures and analysis, may exhibit minor errors.  
  
                                                          
44 Assuming X1 represents the omitted variable, has effect on the independent variable (β1≠0) and correlates with the included variable X2 
(cov(x1,x2) ≠0). 
45 Ordinary least squares (OLS): A linear regression method, which selects estimators so that the sum of squared residuals (the variance of 
the residuals) is minimised.  
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7 Results and analysis 
In this chapter we present the results- and interpretation of the results related to i) the various 
underpricing measurements (univariate- and multivariate testing) and ii) the responses from 
interviews with key industry players. The discussion of our findings is related to established 
empirical evidence and theoretical concepts.  
Note that the terms “significant/significantly” refer to statistical significance, unless otherwise 
is specified. Finally, it is worth mentioning that comparing the magnitudes of our empirical 
results to those postulated in prior research should be done with care, as the method applied in 
computation of initial returns varies between scholars (see Table 3-1 and section 5.2). 
 Univariate testing: T-tests and non-parametric equivalents 
 Underpricing 
Table 7-1 presents the mean initial returns for PE-backed IPOs and both control samples, 
when employing EW- and VW returns.  
We find both PE-backed- and NB IPOs to be significantly underpriced (on average), 
regardless of weighting method. This is consistent with existing empirical research, which 
document significant underpricing of new issues (see Table 3-1). 
                                                          
46 * P < 10%, **P < 5%, *** P <1% 
47 T-test following Goldber et al. (2005): t= 
?̅?1−?̅?2
√?̂?1+?̂?2
, ?̅?𝟏,𝟐 = ∑ (𝑤𝑖 ∗ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ), ?̂?𝟏,𝟐 =
𝑆1,2
𝑛−1
, 𝑺𝟏,𝟐 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖(𝑋𝑖 − ?̅?1,2)
2𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
Table 7-1: Initial returns of PE-backed- and control IPOs46 
The table depicts the mean EW- and VW returns for i) PE-backed IPOs (incl. VC and BO), ii) matched-control sample and iii) total-
control sample. The matching procedure was conducted as follows: For each PE-backed IPO, we selected a control IPO within the same 
ICB industry with the offer size closest to the PE-backed IPO, as the matching firm.  
 
The initial returns were computed using unadjusted first day returns (i.e. change from offer price to closing price on the first trading 
day). The VW returns are weighted based on (inflation-adjusted) offer sizes. One-sample t-tests were employed to test if the mean 
returns differ significantly from zero. The standard deviation of the mean initial return was used when computing the t-statistics. 
 
  Equally weighted  Value weighted47 
 Obs. Mean |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| Obs. Mean |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| 
PE-backed  58 2.942% 3.1397*** 58 2.216% 2.4678*** 
 VC-backed 
 
 BO-backed 
23 
 
35 
1.631% 
 
3.804% 
 
0.92643 
 
3.6824*** 
** 
24 
 
34 
 
1.670% 
 
2.289% 
 
0.9264 
 
2.0260** 
NB (matched-
control) 
60 7.121% 3.6081*** 58 4.853% 3.6084*** 
NB (total-control) 151 6.664% 5.8845*** 151 3.891% 5.6450*** 
All 209 5.631% 6.0510*** 209 4.654% 7.0363*** 
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However, the degree of underpricing for (almost) all samples decreases when weighting the 
returns using (inflation-adjusted) offer sizes48. This suggests smaller IPOs are associated with 
greater underpricing than larger offers, consistent with prior research (Ritter (1984), Barry et 
al. (1990), Bergström et al (2006), Schöber (2008)). Schöber (2008) explains the negative 
relationship between underpricing and offer size by larger offers exhibiting lower levels of 
asymmetric information (which is positively related to initial returns)49, than smaller offers.  
Finally, we find EW- and VW initial return of VC backed IPOs to be insignificantly different 
from zero, suggesting VC backed IPOs are not systematically underpriced (on average). This 
indicates the (significant) underpricing of PE-backed IPOs is driven by the returns of BO-
backed IPOs.   
 Comparison with control IPOs 
Table 7-2 reports the results from testing differences in mean initial returns between PE-
backed IPOs and the two control samples, when employing both EW- and VW returns.  
Based on EW returns, we find PE-backed IPOs to be significantly less underpriced than NB 
IPOs, both when compared to matched reference transactions and to the entire pool of control 
IPOs. Hence, the presence of PE-backing in IPOs appear to ameliorate underpricing, in line 
with prior research (Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1989), Megginson & Weiss (1991), Hogan et 
al. (2001), Schöber (2008), Cao & Lerner (2009)).   
When employing VW returns, we find PE-backed IPOs to exhibit significantly (although 
marginally) lower underpricing than matched-control IPOs. In contrast, the underpricing 
difference is insignificant when comparing the PE sample to the entire pool of control IPOs. 
This suggests offer size affects the difference in mean initial returns across PE-backed- and 
NB IPOs.  Bergström et al. (2006) obtained similar results in their study of PE-backed IPOs 
listed in London and Paris (between 1994 and 2004)50.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that results from the univariate testing do not necessarily imply 
that the presence of PE-backing is solely responsible for lower underpricing of PE-backed 
IPOs, as there are other factors (e.g. industry, time) interrelating with initial returns. We 
                                                          
48 VW return for VC-backed IPOs increases slightly, however we deem the difference (0.0004) insignificant (economically) to elaborate any 
further on this matter.  
49 Asymmetric information: Positively related to initial returns (Ritter (1984, 1987), Barry et al. (1990), Schöber (2008), Lowry et al. (2010)). 
Asymmetric information and risk are assumed to be positively related (Ritter, 1984) 
50 Bergström et al. (2006): Sample consisted of 152 PE-backed IPOs and 1370 NB IPOs listed on London Stock Exchange (both Main 
Market and Alternative Investment Market) and Paris Stock Exchange (Premier-, Second- and Nouveau Marché, Marché Libre). It is worth 
noting that they used market capitalisation as weights when computing VW returns. However, as large-cap firms tend to offer more shares at 
IPOs than small-cap firms, we believe our results are comparable to those of Bergström et al. (2006). 
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therefore find it more appropriate to discuss the potential certification by PE-sponsors (i.e. 
isolate the effect of PE-backing on underpricing) through multivariate regressions (see section 
7.2). 
Table 7-2: Comparison of initial returns between PE-backed- and control IPOs 
The table compares the EW- and VW returns of PE-backed IPOs to NB IPOs, using both control samples. The t-statistics result from two-
sample t-tests with the H0: “Mean initial returns of PE-backed IPOs and control IPOs do not differ significantly”. 
 
  Equally weighted  Value weighted 
 Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| 
PE minus matched-
control 
60/60 -4.274% 1.8523** 58/58 -2.637% 1.6661* 
PE minus total-control 58/151 -3.722% 2.5317*** 58/151 -1.675% 1.4792 
       
       
Table 7-3 summarises the results from testing differences in mean underpricing between PE-
backed IPOs that were not RLBOs, and control IPOs.  
PE-backed IPOs still exhibit significantly lower initial return than NB IPOs, despite exclusion 
of RLBOs. In fact, when we exclude RLBOs, the mean return falls from 2.94% to 2.52%, 
suggesting RLBOs have higher returns than non-reverse PE-backed IPOs. Our results are in 
line with empirical findings by Schöber (2008). However, both our - and Schöber’s (2008) 
findings contradict consensus in academic theory. According to theoretical reasoning, RLBOs 
should exhibit lower underpricing compared to non-reverse IPOs. It follows that RLBOs 
exhibit prior trading history and thereby should enjoy lower levels of asymmetric information 
(Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1989), Ainina & Mohan (1991), Hogan et al. (2001), Ang & Brau 
(2002)).  
On the other hand, we acknowledge that the initial LBO does not represent an exogenous 
event, but rather a result of careful evaluation by the PE-sponsor (i.e. the LBO is not 
randomly chosen)51. Firms selected for public-to-private LBOs may be characterised by 
volatile stock prices and uncertain valuations as the PE-sponsors aim to exploit potential stock 
discounts (Preqin, 2014). Hence, circumstances surrounding the LBO may imply that RLBOs 
exhibit greater levels of asymmetric information (and thereby higher risk) than other IPOs. 
Furthermore, the “additional” information related to RLBOs may be outdated at the time of 
the second IPO, due to changes implemented by PE-sponsors (Schöber, 2008). The reasoning 
above contradicts existing theory suggesting lower underpricing of RLBOs compared to non-
reverse IPOs, but may potentially explain our- and Schöber’s (2008) findings. However, as 
                                                          
51 The interrelation between the entry- and exit of portfolio firms is assessed when analysing responses from interviews in section 0.  
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we could only identify 10 RLBOs in our sample, we acknowledge that our results may be 
attributed to limited sample size.   
Table 7-3: Comparison of initial returns between PE-backed (excl. RLBOs)- and control IPOs 
The table compares the EW returns of PE-backed IPOs, when excluding RLBOs, to the EW returns of control IPOs.  
 
  Equally weighted 
 Obs. Mean T-stat 
PE-backed (excl RLBOs) 48 2.518% 2.3268*** 
NB (total-control) 151 6.664% 5.8845*** 
Difference  
(PE-backed, excl RLBO minus NB) 
48/151 -4.785% 4.1956*** 
    
 Cross-sectional difference across PE-backed IPOs: VC vs. BO 
Table 7-4 presents i) differences in EW- and VW initial returns between the two PE types 
(BO and VC) and their matched-control IPOs, separately and ii) “difference-in-difference”52 
between VC- and BO-backed IPOs (compared to their matched-control IPOs).  
We find VC-backed IPOs to be significantly less underpriced than matched reference 
transactions, based on both EW and VW returns. This is consistent with prior research on the 
effect of VC backing on underpricing (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). In fact, we deem the 
magnitude of underpricing difference as relatively extreme, as VC-backed IPOs on average 
yield 7.09% (EW) lower returns than matched non-VC-backed IPOs. This is larger than the 
difference postulated by Megginson and Weiss (1991), who find that VC-backed IPOs are 
3.6% less underpriced (also using unadjusted first day returns) than matched-control IPOs.  
In contrast, we find that BO-backed IPOs do not exhibit significantly lower underpricing than 
matched-control IPOs, regardless of weighting method. Contradicting this, findings in prior 
research suggest significantly lower underpricing of BO-backed IPOs compared to NB IPOs 
(both matched and non-matched) (Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1989), Hogan et al. (2001), Ang 
& Brau (2002), Schöber (2008), Cao & Lerner (2009)). 
When testing “difference-in-difference”, we find the difference between the differences of 
VC- and BO samples compared to their respective control samples, to be significant when 
employing EW returns. This suggests VC-backed IPOs are significantly less underpriced (on 
average) than BO-backed IPOs, all else equal. Hence, our initial finding (lower underpricing 
of PE-backed IPOs compared to control IPOs, see Table 7-2) appears driven by the VC-
backed offerings in our PE sample. However, one can question the robustness of this result as 
“difference-in-difference” based on VW returns is insignificant.  
                                                          
52 Difference-in-difference: We tested whether the difference of 4.785% was significantly different from 0 using the standard deviation of the 
differences from “VC vs. Matched” and “BO vs. Matched”. 
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To the best of our knowledge, it does not exist any published research comparing 
underpricing of VC- and BO-backed IPOs. However, Schöber (2008) presents a possible 
explanation to our result (i.e. lower underpricing of VC-backed IPOs) based on participation 
rates in IPOs. He argues that high participation rates in an IPO may signal that existing 
owners lack faith in the firm’s prospects, and should thereby be associated with higher risk 
(than IPOs associated with low participation rates). Investors may therefore require greater 
discount (i.e. higher underpricing) from IPOs characterised by high participation rates as 
compensation for increased risk. Furthermore, Schöber (2008) argue that BO-sponsors appear 
to be more “aggressive sellers” in IPOs than VC-sponsors, and should thereby exhibit lower 
underpricing than VC-backed IPOs. Supporting this, we find that sponsors of BO-backed 
firms sell significantly larger stakes at IPOs than sponsors of VC-backed firms. The BO 
sponsors in our sample sold (on average) 45.27% of their shares at IPOs, while the 
corresponding number for VC sponsors is 17.88%53. This line of argumentation may explain 
why we observe greater underpricing of BO-backed IPOs (which are associated with higher 
participation rates) than VC-backed IPOs.    
 
 Robustness 
The robustness of the results related to the t-tests has been assessed using non-parametric 
equivalents.  
We find PE-backed IPOs to be significantly less underpriced than matched NB IPOs, also 
when employing non-parametric testing. This is consistent with the results provided by the 
equivalent t-test and thereby provides additional robustness of our results. However, we 
neither obtain similar robustness verification when comparing PE-backed IPOs to the total-
                                                          
53 Participation rates: The difference (27.40%) is statistically significant at the 1% level. The participation rates are calculated based on 
information extracted from IPO prospectuses, press-releases and news articles.  
54 Difference-in-difference: We tested whether the differences of 4.82% and 0.58% were significantly different from 0 using the standard 
deviation of the differences from “VC vs. Matched” and “BO vs. Matched”. 
Table 7-4:  Comparison of initial returns between VC- and BO-backed IPOs 
The table depicts the difference in EW and VW initial return between: i) The two PE types (VC and BO) and their matched-control IPOs, 
separately and ii) “difference in difference” between VC and BO (vs their matched-control IPOs).  
 
  Equally weighted  Value weighted 
 Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| 
VC minus matched- 
control 
25/25 -7.085% 1.6160** 24/24 -3.148% 1.3216* 
BO minus matched-
control  
35/35 -2.265% 0.9360*** 34/34 -2.573% 1.1934 
Diff-in-Diff54  
((VC-matched)- (BO-
matched)) 
- -4.820% 1.2934* - -0.575% 0.1771 
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control sample, nor when comparing VC- and BO-backed IPOs to their respective matched-
control samples.  
Table 7-5: Robustness assessment using non-parametric tests 
The table compares the EW returns of PE-backed IPOs to other IPOs, using non-parametric tests. Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test was 
applied when testing for differences in underpricing based on the matched-control sample, while Wilcoxon rank sum test was used when 
testing for differences in underpricing based on the total-control sample.  
 
 Observations Z-value  (P-value) 
Difference between PE-backed and 
matched-control sample  
60/60 1.730* 8.360% 
Difference between PE-backed and 
total control sample 
151/58 1.132 25.750% 
Cross-sectional differences    
Difference between VC-backed and 
total-control sample 
25/25 1.197 23.120% 
Difference between BO-backed and 
total-control sample 
35/35 0.164 86.990% 
    
 Multivariate regression 
We performed multivariate regressions in an attempt to isolate the (potential) effect of PE-
backing on underpricing, from other determinants of initial returns (e.g. aftermarket volatility, 
industry, market timing etc.) (see Table 7-6 ).  
Table 7-6: Multivariate regressions 
The table below reports the coefficients and the corresponding standard error (in parenthesis) and (absolute) t-values from three 
regressions. The regressions are run with initial returns (IR) as the dependent variable, and variables assumed to affect initial returns as 
independent variables. The regressions are estimated with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
 
(1)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐾 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑂 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸 + 𝛽909 + 𝛽910 +  𝜀 
(2)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼2 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑂 + 𝛾2𝑉𝐶 + ⋯ +  𝛽910 + 𝜔 
(3)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼3 + 𝛾1𝐵𝑂 + 𝛾2𝑉𝐶 + ⋯ 𝛽5𝑆𝑇𝐷 + ⋯ + 𝛽910 + 𝜑 
“PE”/”BO”/”VC” - dummy variable equal to one if the IPO is PE/BO/VC-backed and zero otherwise. “PRESTund” - dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm’s underwriter is “prestigious”. “lnOS” - the natural logarithm of (deflated) offer sizes. “HIGHTECH”- dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm belongs to the telecommunication or technology industry. “STD” - the standard deviation of daily returns 
over 19 days, beginning the day after the IPO date. “DK”, “NO” and “FI” – country-specific dummy variables for Denmark, Norway and 
Finland respectively. Hence, Sweden represents the reference category. “2009” and “2010” – time specific dummy variables for 2009 and 
2010.  
 (REGRESSION 1) (REGRESSION 2) (REGRESSION 3) 
VARIABLES IR IR IR 
PE -0.0554***   
 
 (0.01919) 
 |t|: 2.8868 
  
VC  -0.0833*** -0.0664** 
 
 (0.03153)  
|t|: 2.6431 
(0.02764)  
|t|: (2.4035) 
BO  -0.0308* -0.0140 
 
 (0.01666)  
|t|: 1.8487 
(0.01580) 
|t|: 0.8886 
PRESTund 0.0338* 0.0301 0.0260 
 
(0.01825)  
|t|: 1.8512 
(0.01853) 
|t|: 1.6220 
(0.01848) 
|t|: 1.4065 
lnOS -0.0114** -0.0124** -0.0024 
 
(0.00543) 
|t|: (2.1019) 
(0.00567) 
|t|: (2.1924) 
(0.00608) 
|t|: (0.3992) 
HIGHTECH 0.1353* 0.1416* 0.0988 
 (0.07568) (0.07696) (0.06507) 
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 Certification by PE-sponsors in general   
Based on regression 1, we find that the presence of  PE-sponsors in IPOs reduce the degree of  
underpricing, consistent with findings from our univariate testing (see section 7.1.2) and prior 
academic contributions (Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1989), Hogan et al. (2001), Ang & Brau 
(2002), Schöber (2008), Cao & Lerner (2009)). As we distinguish between VC- and BO-
backed IPOs in our study, we have decided to not elaborate further on the PE-dummy, but 
rather examine the effects of VC- and BO-backing separately.  
 Certification by VC- and BO sponsors in particular 
We find VC-backed IPOs to be significantly less underpriced than control IPOs. This is 
consistent with our findings from univariate testing (see section 7.1.2) and in line with 
previous research on VC backing in IPOs (Megginson & Weiss, 1991). Hence, the presence 
of venture capitalists in IPOs appear to ameliorate underpricing, even when controlling for 
other factors assumed to affect initial returns. Consensus in previous literature attribute this 
result to venture capitalists being able to certify the true firm value in IPOs, as they have 
                                                          
55 An interpretation of the constant is not particularly informative as our sample does not include obs. with lnOS and STD equal to zero 
56 F-value: F-tests assess multiple coefficients simultaneously and tests H0: All independent variables are insignificant simultaneously. 
Hence, the F-value presents the overall significance of the regression. 
57 R-squared (the explanatory power of the regression) represents the variation in the dependent variable (initial returns), which is explained 
by the variation of the independent variables included in the model. To illustrate, R-Squared is 29% in regression 3, implying the 
independent variables in regression 3 model explain 29% of the variation in initial returns. 
|t|: (1.7879) |t|: (1.8403) |t|: (1.5181) 
STD   2.5803** 
 
  (1.06744) 
|t|: (2.4173) 
DK 0.02547 0.02753 0.01006 
 
(0.04879) 
|t|: (0.52203) 
(0.04863) 
|t|: (0.56600) 
(0.04350) 
|t|: (0.23120) 
NO -0.05169* -0.04821* -0.04327* 
 
(0.02713) 
|t|: (1.90508) 
(0.02634) 
|t|: (1.83022) 
(0.02379) 
|t|: (1.81862) 
FI -0.10852** -0.10651** -0.07549* 
 
(0.04545) 
|t|: (0.02547) 
(0.04521) 
|t|: 0.02753 
(0.03886) 
|t|: 0.01006 
2009 -0.1495*** -0.1463*** -0.2136*** 
 
(0.04758) 
|t|: (3.1422) 
(0.04711) 
|t|: (3.1063) 
(0.07850) 
|t|: (2.7216) 
2010 -0.0751*** -0.0755*** -0.0787*** 
 
(0.02031) 
|t|: (3.6976) 
(0.01978) 
|t|: (3.8153) 
(0.02087) 
|t|: (3.7697) 
Constant55 0.1789* 0.1962** -0.0136 
 
(0.10727) 
|t|: (1.8739) 
(0.11132) 
|t|: (1.9741) 
(0.12508) 
|t|: (0.1167) 
F-value56 F(9,203) = 3.44 F(10,202 )= 3.38 F(11,201) = 2.65 
 Prob>F=0.0006 Prob>F=0.0004 Prob>F=0.0034 
Observations 213 213 213 
R-squared57 0.1727 0.1791 0.2907 
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reputational capital at stake (due to frequent interaction with capital markets) (Barry et al. 
(1990), Megginson & Weiss (1991), Lee & Wahal (2004)). It follows that VC backing 
certifies that the offer price reflects relevant inside information and thereby reduce ex-ante 
uncertainty (and asymmetric information) related to the IPO58. As ex-ante uncertainty is 
positively related to risk, investors should require lower risk premiums (in terms of initial 
returns) when investing in VC-backed IPOs compared to NB IPOs. (Partly) supporting this, 
Schöber (2008) argues that VC-backed firms receive lower underpricing in IPOs as a 
“reward” for their experience and expertise in monitoring their investments.   
Contradicting the certification hypothesis, Habib and Ljunqvist (2001) argue that owners of 
VC-backed IPOs typically sell larger stakes at IPOs than the “average” owner, and thereby 
have greater incentives to reduce underpricing. However, to the best of our knowledge, this 
claim is not backed by empirical evidence.  
In the context of BO-sponsors, we find “BO” to be marginally significant in regression 2. This 
suggests BO backing reduces underpricing, in accordance with existing empirical evidence 
(Muscarella & Vetsuypens (1989), Ainina & Mohan (1991), Hogan et al. (2001), Cao & 
Lerner (2009)). However, once we control for aftermarket volatility (“STD”), which exhibits 
a significant and positive coefficient, the coefficient of “BO” approaches zero and turns 
insignificant (see regression 3). This suggests a negative correlation between “BO” and 
“STD”59. Hence, “BO” appears significant in regression 2, simply because BO-backed IPOs 
are associated with low aftermarket volatility (which in turn is positively related to initial 
returns)60. We can thereby not deliver sufficiently strong evidence that certification by BO-
sponsors reduce underpricing. These findings are in line with univariate testing results (see 
section 7.1.3) and resemble Schöber’s (2008) findings in his study of BO-backed IPOs in the 
US61.  
Schöber (2008) suggests that lack of evidence supporting the certification hypothesis, may be 
due to the strength of certification depending crucially on the quality of the PE-sponsor. 
Supporting this, Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Lee and Wahal (2004) 
document a significant and positive relationship between underpricing and the quality of the 
                                                          
58 Ex-ante uncertainty: Uncertainty about firm value once it starts trading. 
59 Confirmation of correlation: The correlation between “STD” and “BO” is -18.5%*** (see Table 10-7 (correlation matrix) in Appendix). 
60 The estimator for BO is likely underestimated and biased in Regression 2, which leaves the impression that BO-backing affects initial 
returns (See section 10.5 in Appendix for mathematical explanation of the consequences of OVB). 
61 Schöber (2008):  In his regression analysis he studies 432 BO-backed IPOs and 591 (group) matched-control IPOs listed in the US 
between 1973 and 2007.  
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PE-sponsors62. Contradicting this, we find no significant relationship between the quality of 
the PE-sponsor and the level of underpricing (see Table 10-11 in Appendix). 
 Certification by “prestigious” underwriters  
Surprisingly, results from regression 1 suggest firms taken public by “prestigious” 
underwriters are more underpriced than firms associated with less reputable underwriters. In 
contrast, prior research documents a negative relationship between underpricing and use of 
“prestigious” underwriters (Carter & Manaster, 1990). It follows that as underwriters 
repeatedly interact with capital markets, they may be incentivised to maintain their reputation 
through accurate pricing (i.e. low levels of mispricing).  
Our result resemble those outlined in the more recent studies by Beatty and Welch (1996), 
Kirkulak and Davis (2005) and Schöber (2008) who also document a positive relationship 
between underpricing and use of “prestigious” underwriters. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are no rational explanations for this relationship outlined in prior research. However, the 
result could potentially be attributed to an endogeneity63 (self-selection) issue. Issuers who 
expect (abnormal) underpricing choose “prestigious” underwriters hoping they are able to 
reduce (the expected) underpricing. However, “prestigious” underwriters may only partly be 
able to improve the IPO pricing and demand, still leaving the firms with abnormal levels of 
underpricing. It is worth noting that “PRESTund” turns insignificant when controlling for 
“BO” and “VC” in regression 2, in line with evidence from Barry et al. (1990). 
 Asymmetric information and ex-ante uncertainty 
We use aftermarket volatility (“STD”), offer size (“lnOS”) and a dummy-variable for high-
tech industries (“HIGHTECH”) as proxies for the degree of ex-ante uncertainty related to 
“true” firm value, following Ritter (1984, 1987), Barry et al. (1990), Schöber (2008), Lowry 
et al. (2010). These studies document a positive relationship between underpricing and ex-
ante uncertainty. The degrees of ex-ante uncertainty and asymmetric information associated 
with an issue are closely interrelated, and in turn (positively) related to the risk associated 
with an IPO. This suggests investors should require greater initial returns from firms 
                                                          
62 Proxies for monitoring skill/quality of PE-sponsors:Age, experience, number of previous IPOs, fund raising ability, ownership share of the 
PE-sponsors. 
63 Endogeneity can arise when an independent variable represent the dependent variable (two-way causality). In this case, the independent 
variable correlates with the variation of the dependent variable, which in turn is relegated to the error term (i.e. breaches Assumption 3 (see 
Section 10.4.1, Appendix) (Medvedev, 2012).  
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associated with high levels of ex-ante uncertainty than firms with more certain valuations, as 
compensation for higher risk.  
Based on regression 2, the results for “lnOS” and “HIGHTECH” are in line with what one can 
expect based on prior research (Barry et al. (1990), Loughran & Ritter (2004), Schöber 
(2008)). First, offer size is negatively related to the level of IPO underpricing. As argued in 
prior research, underpricing decreases with offer size since it is negatively related to the 
degree of asymmetric information and ex-ante uncertainty (Schöber, 2008). Second, we find 
that firms operating in high-tech industries, are significantly more underpriced than firms 
from other industries. Prior research attributes this result to firms in high-tech industries being 
associated with relatively high levels of ex-ante uncertainty and asymmetric information (i.e. 
are riskier than firms from other industries) (Schöber, 2008).  
From regression 3, we find the coefficient related to aftermarket volatility (“STD”) to be 
significantly- and positively related to initial returns. This is consistent with prior research 
(Ritter, 1984) (Barry et al., 1990) (Ainina & Mohan, 1991). It follows that firms with high 
aftermarket volatility tend to be associated with uncertain firm values before the IPO (Ritter, 
1987). This suggests investors in IPOs characterised by high aftermarket volatility should 
require greater initial returns to compensate for high ex-ante uncertainty (and thereby risk)64.  
However, when controlling for aftermarket volatility in regression 3, the coefficients of both 
“lnOS” and “HIGHTECH” approaches zero and turn insignificant. Furthermore, we find that 
“lnOS” (“HIGHTECH”) is significantly negatively (positively) correlated with “STD”65. This 
suggests small offers operating in high-tech industries exhibit higher aftermarket volatility 
than larger offers in other industries, in line with Schöber’s (2008) reasoning. Hence, when 
omitting “STD”, the estimator of “lnOS” (“HIGHTECH”) appears to underestimate 
(overestimate) the effect of offer size (operating in high-tech industries) on underpricing (i.e. 
regression 2 suffers from omitted variable bias).  
In summary, our finding that aftermarket volatility is positively related to initial returns is 
consistent with previous research. We believe this relationship can be attributed to the close 
interrelation between aftermarket volatility and asymmetric information/ex-ante uncertainty, 
as outlined in prior research. In contrast, offer size and high-tech firms do not appear to be 
                                                          
64 This strategy is difficult to follow in practice, as aftermarket volatility related to an issue is known post IPO.  
65 The correlation between “STD” and “lnOS” is -34.3***% and +25.0%*** between “STD” and “HIGHTECH” (see Feil! Fant ikke 
referansekilden.(correlation matrix) in Appendix). 
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independently related to underpricing, inconsistent with previous research. We suspect this 
can be explained by multicollinearity problems as the correlations between “STD” and 
“OS”/”HIGHTECH” are highly significant (see Table 10-7, Appendix). The multicollinearity 
may potentially be due to “lnOS”, “HIGHTECH” and “STD” measuring the same underlying 
cause (risk, ex-ante uncertainty and asymmetric info), in which “STD” outperform the other 
measures.   
 Country specific market conditions 
We document that firms listed in Norway and Finland were significantly less underpriced than 
listings in Sweden (based on all regressions). The former relationship is consistent with 
empirical findings by Pukthuanthong et al. (2013)66, who document considerably lower 
underpricing of IPOs in Norway (1.67%) compared to Sweden (6.62%). The same study 
documents higher underpricing of IPOs in Finland (14.09%) compared to Sweden, which 
contradicts our result.  
 Time specific market conditions 
We find that IPOs listed in 2009 and 2010 were significantly less underpriced than IPOs listed 
in other years. Our results can possibly be explained by cyclicality of IPO activity and the 
existence of “hot”- and “cold” issue markets (Ibbotson & Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984), 
Loughran & Ritter (2004))67. To illustrate, Loughran and Ritter (2004) document that the 
average underpricing was 65% in the “hot” dot-com years of 1999-2000, while the average 
underpricing was “only” 12% during the “colder” IPO markets in 2001-2003. Furthermore, 
prior research documents strong positive correlation between IPO underpricing between IPO 
underpricing and stock market returns (1994). Hence, the “cold” nature of the stock market 
years between 2008 and 2010 represents a possible explanations for the low initial returns 
characterising listings in 2009 and 201068.  
 Qualitative approach: Analysis of in-depth interviews  
In this section, we present the analysis based on in-depth interviews with industry players 
representing the renowned PE firms; Altor Equity Partners, EQT, FSN Capital, Herkules 
Capital and HitechVision. More precisely, we spoke to one deputy CEO, one former CEO 
(now chairman and partner) and three partners (one is also head of the Norwegian subsidiary) 
                                                          
66 Pukthuanthong et al. (2013): Studied underpricing of 6025 IPOs in 34 different countries listed between 1995 and 2002.  
67 Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) define “hot” (“cold”) issue markets as periods with abnormally high (low) initial returns.  
68 We used FTSE Nordic index as a proxy for the “temperature” of the stock market. 
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of Nordic PE firms in addition to one industry-expert with experience from Acquisition 
Finance (i.e. acquisitions related to LBOs).  
There are several exit opportunities available to PE-sponsors when they want to divest their 
portfolio firms. According to our respondents, the most common exit routes are i) taking the 
portfolio firm public (IPO), ii) sell the portfolio firm to an industrial player (trade sale) and iii) 
sell the portfolio firm to another PE-sponsor (secondary buyout) (see Figure 7-1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 The relationship between entry and exit of portfolio firms  
The link between choice of portfolio firms (entries) and the subsequent exits became apparent 
through discussions with the GPs. They told us that identification and thorough analysis of 
potential exit routes represent a highly integrated part of the investment phase. One 
participant emphasised they rarely enter new investments unless at least two- out of the three 
exit routes outlined in Figure 7-1 are open.  
 “I cannot express how important liquidity at exit is for our business. The value-creation 
during the ownership period can be as outstanding as ever, but is of little comfort when there 
are no interested buyers or available exit routes.” – Respondent 2 (R2)  
“Prior to new entries, we spend a substantial amount of time analysing how exchanges, 
financial and industrial buyers will value the potential investment at exit. We never enter new 
investments when the window of exit opportunities is considered too narrow.” – R4 
“If we see limited exit opportunities for a potential target, for instance if there is only one 
relevant industrial buyer, it may represent a deal-breaker for realisation of an entry.” – R5   
Hence, the exit routes chosen by PE-sponsors appears to be closely interrelated with the entry 
of the particular firms. PE firms may drop an investment if, for instance, the M&A 
environment in the relevant industry is poor or they see too few buyers. This implies the exit 
opportunities relevant to an investment case may have decisive implications for whether the 
IPO Trade sale 
Portfolio firm  
Secondary buyout 
Exit routes 
Figure 7-1: The most common exit routes according to our respondents 
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PE-sponsors enter or not. In relation to our empirical analysis, this suggests a sample of PE-
backed IPOs may systematically differ from NB IPOs, due to selection criteria determining 
the entry of the firm. 
 Choice of exit route 
When asked about the main factors driving the choice of exit strategy, five respondents 
emphasised the importance of satisfying pricing and efficient divestment. R1 and R2 stated 
they preferred immediate and complete divestment, as the “passive ownership role” following 
a gradual selling process contradicts their business model. They want to possess full control 
and influential power to change the management, implement operational improvements and 
customise the capital structure. Two respondents also expressed the importance of minimising 
the transaction risk, as running exit processes require considerable costs to lawyers, auditors, 
consultants and underwriters. “Fees to lawyers alone may accumulate to 2-3 million (NOK)” 
– R2. Similarly, Povaly (2006) finds “certainty of execution” to represent the second most 
important factor determining the choice of exit route (after “state of capital markets”), in his 
qualitative study of divestments by European PE firms 69.   
Five out of six respondents expressed a strong preference for trade sales over other exit 
channels, all else equal, while one respondent stated that no single exit route was preferred 
over other routes. “The preferred exit route for an investment, depends on firm 
characteristics, timing, industry and other circumstances surrounding that specific 
divestment.” – R4 
Supporting the preference for trade sales, almost 50% of all exits completed by Nordic 
sponsors in 2014 represented sales to industrial buyers (Argentum Private Equity, 2014). This 
supports findings by Povaly (2006), who documents that the majority of his respondents 
preferred trade sales over other exit routes70. In contrast, IPO appears to be the preferred 
divestment by PE-sponsors in the US PE market, as noted by Povaly (2006) and Jenkinson 
and Sousa (2015). 
Our respondents listed several reasons for their preference for trade sales over other exit 
routes. First, it enables a complete and immediate divestment of the portfolio firm, as opposed 
to IPOs, which commonly require continuous ownership through contractual lock-up 
agreements. Second, trade sales are generally not subject to the levels of regulations, 
                                                          
69 Povaly’s research design: He conducted a qualitative study of European divestments by questioning 56 active European BO firms  
70 Povaly’s findings: 37 firms (66%) preferred trade sales, 14 firms (25%) expressed no single exit route was preferred over others, 2 firms 
(4%) preferred secondary buyout, while 1 firm (2%) preferred IPO.  
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disclosures and rules required when going public. Third (and emphasised as the most 
important reason), trade sales often provide the best pricing as the buyer may be willing to 
pay a premium for potential synergies. In addition, competition among industrial buyers may 
put upward pressure on the price. “All else equal, we prefer the exit which offers the best 
price, and motivated industrial players are by far the most generous.”- R2. “We prefer trade 
sales, all else equal, as industrial buyers are often willing to pay premium for potential 
synergies.” – R6. The pricing argument is backed by evidence from Povaly (2006), whose 
respondents marked trade sales as the exit route that historically has generated the highest 
returns. In contrast, Bienz (2004) documents that IPOs yield higher rates of return than trade 
sales71. However, he argues the result may be attributed to selection bias as highly profitable 
firms tend to be taken public, while less profitable firms are more often divested through trade 
sales. Supporting this, Cumming and Macintosh (2003b) find that IPO represents the 
preferred exit route for high quality and - valued firms.  
R2 remarked that trade sales often complicate the exit process as it is more time-consuming 
and bureaucratic than secondary buyouts. He stated that PE firms usually spends 6-8 weeks on 
determining the price and purchase conditions, while the same process may take up to one 
year when the buyer is an industry player. Moreover, PE-sponsors often run sales-dialogues 
with industrial and financial buyers at the same time (i.e. multi-track selling process), in order 
to pressure the price and limit the transaction risk. This implies PE-sponsors must commence 
the sales-dialogue with the trade buyers before contacting financial buyers. This can result in 
informational leakage to the market, which in turn may prevent other buyers from exhibiting 
interest in the portfolio firm. As stated by R2; “The time consuming nature of trade sales 
compared to secondary buyouts is “high-risk”, as information about our exit may reach 
buyers who feel “kept in the dark” since they were not included from the beginning. This may 
result in fewer buyers, lower competition and worse pricing.” 
When discussing differences in exit strategies between VC- and BO firms, all respondents 
agreed the main dissimilarity was higher required rate of return related to exiting VC firms.  
They emphasised that despite blurred boundaries distinguishing VC- and BO firms, VC firms 
are generally riskier as they tend to be smaller, younger and operating in “newer” industries 
                                                          
71 Bienz (2004) used data from CEPRES and compared 108 PE-backed IPOs to 423 trade sales (by PE firms). He found that the mean 
(median) internal rate of return was 123.4% (58.4%) for IPOs and 75.3% (18.32%) for trade sales. The result was within the 90% confidence 
interval (t=1.706).   
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(e.g. high-tech industries) than BO firms. “We generally require higher rates of return when 
exiting VC firms, as these firms tend be riskier than the more mature BO firms.” – R2. 
 IPO as an exit route  
Four respondents expressed an aversion towards using IPO as an exit strategy, while two 
exhibited a somewhat more positive attitude towards it. To illustrate, R3 referred to IPO as the 
exit of “last resort”. They listed several disadvantages related to divesting portfolio firms 
through IPOs.   
First, it is challenging to achieve efficient divestment through IPOs, as offerings often require 
continuation of ownership through contractual lock-up agreements. R1 stated that: “IPOs 
often require PE owners to retain a passive ownership stake post IPO, which is not 
compatible with our strategy of always possessing an ownership stake ensuring controlling-
and influential power.” Supporting this, R2 argued that: “Following an IPO, we are often 
required to maintain minimum 50% ownership, which implies full responsibility without full 
freedom to do whatever we want.” However, R6 underlined that the degree of control 
following an IPO also depends on the cooperation between the PE firm and other (major) 
owners. “We have continued to be active owners post IPO in some cases, due to mutual 
agreement and trust between us and other major owners” – R6. 
R4 stated that being public limits their ability to implement changes efficiently as regulations 
and the existence of other owners increase the bureaucracy of the firm. However, the 
respondent argued that this does not necessarily represent a disadvantage with IPOs and 
added; “We never take firms public before we have implemented all intended changes. In my 
opinion, going public is just a way of signalling that the firm is ready to “live” without our 
backing, experience and expertise. Hence, taking a more passive role is a natural result of the 
decision to take an investment public.”  
R2 commented on a new trend that may reduce the disadvantage of the slow divestment 
achieved through IPOs. “Investors appear to be less naive and exhibit greater acceptance of 
our objective with IPOs [i.e. to achieve efficient divestment] than in the early 2000s. Hence, 
in line with what we have seen recently, PE-sponsors are now more often required to sell as 
much as possible at IPOs, in order to avoid cascades of subsequent sales putting downward 
pressure on the stock price.” To illustrate, R2 referred to Orkla’s public offering of 
Borregaard, in which Orkla was required to retain maximum 20% ownership share post IPO.  
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Second, three of the respondents stated the exchange is a complicated place to enter and stay. 
They noted that the extent of requirements, regulations and rules associated with the listing- 
and being listed represent disadvantages of using IPO as an exit strategy. Furthermore, one 
respondent stated that going public drives an unfortunate short term focus with maximisation 
of next quarter’s performance representing the main objective. 
Third, the majority of the respondents claimed that IPOs often imply worse pricing than other 
exit channels. “Investors may perceive IPO of portfolio firms as a “hit and run” by the PE 
firms, as they believe their main objective is to achieve the best price before “escaping” as 
fast as possible. This perception may in turn result in PE firms being forced to offer investors 
a discount when taking their portfolio firms public.” – R2. This proposition suggests PE-
backed IPOs should be more underpriced than NB IPOs, in contrast with our empirical results 
and evidence outlined in prior research (see Table 3-2).   
However, as there are numerous PE-backed offerings on Nordic exchanges annually, there 
must be some factors causing IPOs of portfolio firms. The respondents listed a few reasons to 
why PE firms in some instances use IPO as an exit route.  
First, R2 and R6 stated that IPOs are sometimes (partly) caused by pressure from fund-
investors (LPs), (especially) when the relevant firm is abnormally successful, sufficiently 
large and exhibit further growth expectations. In such cases, the fund-investors generally want 
to realise parts of the investment while still being able to harvest from future value creation. 
Two respondents stated the motivation of going public by fund-investors also applies to the 
PE-sponsors themselves: “Exiting through public offerings enables participation in future 
value creation of successful portfolio firms, while at the same time taking some “risk off the 
table”” – R6. “IPO may represent the favourable exit for successful, large- and growing 
firms, as it enables realisation of parts of the investment without abandoning future growth 
opportunities.” – R4.  
Supporting this, Cumming and MacIntosh (2003b) document that IPO represents the preferred 
exit route for high-quality and -valued portfolio firms. This suggests a sample of PE-backed 
IPOs may be biased towards containing firms that are more “successful” than the average NB 
IPO. This may explain the lower underpricing of PE-backed- compared to NB IPOs observed 
in our- and prior empirical studies. It follows that particularly “successful” firms may be 
subject to high demand among investors prior to the IPO, putting upward pressure on the offer 
price.  
70 
 
Second, the respondents agreed that favourable market sentiment and -timing may justify 
taking a portfolio firm public. This is consistent with findings by Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), 
who document that PE-sponsors tend to take their portfolio firms public when equity 
valuations are high (i.e. the IPO markets are “hot”). Supporting this, we document that there 
were many PE-backed IPOs in the “hot” IPO markets of 2005, 2006 and 2007, while there 
were no PE-backed IPOs in the “colder” markets of 2008 and 200972.  
Finally, the respondents stated they are sometimes forced to exit through IPOs, when the other 
exit routes are “closed”. For instance, IPO may represent the only exit route for large BO 
firms as there may not exist industrial or financial buyers with sufficient capital to acquire the 
firm. This suggests that taking a portfolio firm public may represent the “exit route of last 
resort” in some instances.   
Schöber (2008) argue that reduction of leverage represents an important motive for taking 
portfolio firms public. Contradicting this, R4 stated that reducing leverage is rather a 
requirement of going public; “When private, our portfolio firms have leverage ratios around 
4x EBITDA, while the maximum ratio allowed by exchanges I believe is around 2x EBITDA. 
Hence, when deciding to go public you also choose to pay off debt, which is typically done 
through issuance of primary shares.” This reasoning suggests Schöber’s (2008) analysis of 
the causality related to IPO and reduction of leverage may be misleading; PE firms do not 
necessarily take their portfolio public to reduce leverage, but reducing leverage is rather a 
requirement related to the decision to go public.   
In relation to debt financing, R5 emphasised how public bond financing may affect equity 
pricing of IPOs. The respondent stated that the performance of publically traded bonds are 
typically used as a reference when pricing IPOs of firms associated with the bonds. “Well- 
performing publically traded bonds may increase the credibility of the portfolio firm in a 
subsequent IPO, and thereby enhance firm valuation.” – R5. This suggests PE-backed firms 
with (well-performing) publically traded bonds may possess higher probability of being exited 
through a public listing than firms without (or with poorly-performing) publically traded 
bonds. 
In summary, the interviews leave us with an impression that PE-sponsors take their portfolio 
firms public primarily when the portfolio firm is particularly “successful” (and sufficiently 
large) or in absence of other available exit channels. The latter contradicts consensus in prior 
                                                          
72 Number of PE-backed IPOs in parenthesis: 2005 (13), 2006 (11), 2007 (11), 2008 (0) and 2009 (0).  
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literature presenting IPO as the “ultimate goal” for PE-sponsors, as noted by Povaly (2006) 
and Jenkinson and Sousa (2015)).  
 When do PE firms exit? 
All the GPs in our sample stated they exit their investments when they have achieved 
predetermined goals rather than exiting after a certain number of years. “We pursue an 
overall goal of doubling EBITDA of our investments within five years. Depending on the 
development of the company and market conditions, doubling EBITDA can both happen 
before- and after the initial five-year timeline, and the exit is thus adjusted accordingly.” – 
R5.  
They also exit if an abnormally lucrative opportunity becomes available. Supporting this, R2 
expressed the importance of exhibiting a pro-active divestment strategy by always staying one 
step ahead of other market participants. “After an ownership period of two to three years, we 
usually conduct thorough analysis of the company, in order to be prepared for the subsequent 
exit. We always want to be the party with superior knowledge about every detail concerning 
our portfolio firms.” – R2. 
In addition, they expressed the importance of exiting investments not satisfying expectations 
as it is expensive to incubate losing projects. This is particularly relevant today, following the 
challenging financial and economic environment. “The exit related to the oil-and gas firms we 
did not manage to sell by December 2014, will probably be postponed for several years due to 
the challenging market. This is costly, both due to expensive exit processes [that do not 
materialise] and due to the fact that these firms generally lack profitability in today’s 
market.” – R2.  
 Choice of underwriter 
All the GPs in our sample emphasised they generally do not turn to the same underwriter for 
assistance in PE transactions. Instead, they aim to choose the underwriter appropriate for each 
transaction in terms of industry-specialisation (e.g. Clarksons Platou specialise in shipping, 
offshore and oil service), exchange (e.g. SSE, OSE) and transaction type (e.g. M&A, IPO). 
Furthermore, R2 and R4 claim they deliberately do not use the same underwriter in order to 
ensure no underwriter believe they get the deals “automatically”. “We want to encourage the 
investment banks to really work for our proposals in order to ensure they do not “rest on 
their laurels” believing they get our deals anyways.” – R2. Hence, our respondents suggest 
the choice of underwriter is not (mainly) determined by reputation (i.e. “prestigious” 
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underwriters), but rather the “fit” between the underwriter and the specific case. This (partly) 
contradicts our finding that PE-backed IPOs appear to be taken public by more reputable 
underwriters than NB IPOs73.  
One respondent also stated they usually invite 2 or 3 underwriters to pitch their offers and 
subsequently select the superior proposal. However, the respondent added that this strategy is 
somewhat risky with respect to exits: “The rejected underwriters will immediately turn 
around and approach potential buyers in hopes of obtaining a purchase mandate.”- R2. 
R1 stated they commonly use international underwriters as they believe foreign investment 
banks work harder and deliver better results than their Nordic counterparts. This is in line 
with our finding that international underwriters are more commonly used in IPOs by Nordic 
PE-backed firms compared to NB firms74.  
 Comments to our empirical results 
The majority of the respondents exhibited mixed feelings related to discussing underpricing of 
IPOs and refrained from sharing their thoughts regarding our empirical results. Some stated 
they were uncomfortable with their knowledge of the phenomenon, while others found it 
difficult to discuss it informally as there is no unambiguous definition of underpricing (also 
discussed in section 3.1). However, two respondents still proposed potential explanations to 
why PE-backed IPOs appear less underpriced than other IPOs (as observed in our- and prior 
empirical studies).  
First, R3 argued that lower underpricing of PE-backed IPOs may be attributed to PE-backed 
IPOs being timed- and promoted better than NB IPOs. “GPs may be better at timing and 
promoting offers than “normal” owners, as they engage in several IPOs. This may in turn 
provide lower discount to investors of IPOs backed by PE and thereby explain their lower 
underpricing.” – R3.  
Second, R5 stated that some PE-sponsors may strive to maximise the offer price when exiting 
through IPOs in order to boost the proceeds from their participation in IPO exits. This can in 
turn lead to lower discounts to fair valuation and thereby lower underpricing compared to NB 
IPOs. However, the respondent emphasised his aversion towards this strategy. “We believe 
this [i.e. maximise the offer price at IPOs] represents short-term thinking, as it is important 
                                                          
73 “Prestigious” underwriters: 54% of PE-backed IPOs and 26% of NB IPOs used “prestigious” underwriters. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 1%-level (T-stat = 3.401, P-value=0.0005). 
74 24% (14/59) of PE-backed IPOs in our sample use international underwriters, while the corresponding number for control IPOs is 6% 
(8/141). 
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for us [i.e. PE-sponsors] to maintain a good track-record among investors since we 
frequently interact with equity markets. Overpricing of IPOs today could therefore harm the 
demand in future IPO exits as overpricing is not well-received by investors.” – R5. 
Supporting this, R6 stated he preferred to set the offer price lower than implied by actual 
valuation/expected demand in order to reduce the risk of overpricing.  
 The PE industry: Recent development and new trends 
Our respondents underlined recent development- and new trends in the PE industry (see 
Figure 7-2).   
First, the most notable development (according to our respondents) is the trend towards 
greater degree of industry specialisation among PE firms. They explained the development as 
a natural result of fiercer competition in the PE industry and other investment classes (e.g. 
investment funds, hedge funds). This makes it more difficult for the PE firms to deliver 
returns beyond index-, fund- and stock market returns.  
“In the early 2000s, the PE industry was dominated by generalists who managed to deliver 
abnormal returns due to being “world champions” in excel modelling. Today, everybody is 
“world champions” in excel. Hence, profitability in the PE industry now requires industry-
specific knowledge and experience unique to the particular PE firm.” – R2.  
R4 emphasised that intensified competition in the PE industry will amplify the competition in 
bidding rounds for new targets, making it more difficult to enter investments at large 
discounts. The respondent argued that going forward, the return in the PE industry will mainly 
be achieved during the private ownership period and not through bargain entries. “I believe 
the distinction between PE firms that are good value creators and those that are just good 
bargainers will become apparent through greater return spreads between PE firms. In my 
opinion, the intensified competition surrounding PE investments, will drive the latter out of 
the market.” – R4. 
Greater degree of 
specialisation 
Growth in secondary 
buyouts 
More PE firms going 
public  
Trends in the Nordic PE industry 
Investments in new 
industries 
Funds opening up for 
(smaller)  
private investors 
Figure 7-2: Current trends in the PE industry. Authors’ chart based on information acquired through interviews 
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Second, the respondents agreed that an already prominent development is the trend towards 
investing in new industries. Previously, as noted by R2, PE firms mainly invested in retail and 
pharmaceutical industries as these industries are characterised by being “immune” to business 
cycles. “PE firms have started to enter more cyclical industries such as shipping and oil-
services. Going forward, I believe PE firms will examine and enter new industries as a 
reaction to intensified competition.” – R1. 
Third, three respondents stated that it is becoming more common to exit through secondary 
buyouts. R6 emphasised this trend as already apparent in the (remaining) European PE market 
and expects secondary sales to become more common in the Nordic region as well. This 
supports findings by Jenkinson and Sousa (2015), who document that the majority of the 1022 
European PE exits in their sample were secondary buyouts75. One respondent listed several 
advantages associated with secondary sales: “Secondary sales are generally quicker, simpler 
and of lower transaction risk compared to other exit channels, as PE players are familiar 
with the process, procedures and formalities related to exits.”- R2. (Partly) supporting this, 
Jenkinson and Sousa (2015) argue that secondary buyouts are gaining popularity as they are 
characterised by providing quick exit processes, certain proceeds and low risk of regulatory 
issues.  
Forth, two of the respondents suspect there is a trend towards approaching private (and 
smaller) investors directly when raising new funds. R1 claims this is due to i) avoiding the 
complexity of handling- and satisfying large industrial players (who dominate the PE funds 
today) and ii) there is unexploited demand among the smaller, private investors. To illustrate, 
R1 noted that KKR76 is considering accepting fund-contributions down to USD10 000 and 
thereby targeting a larger audience than today’s minimum requirements77. Following this 
trend, R1 expects funds-in-funds will struggle going forward, simply due to the possibility for 
private investors to invest directly in the PE funds and thereby eliminating a fee-demanding 
intermediate. Contradicting the trend underlined by R1, R6 argued that the extent of 
regulations and requirements drives the trend in the opposite direction (i.e. towards even more 
sophisticated investors), at least in Europe.  
Fifth, two of the respondents believe we will see more PE firms going public themselves. 
“Public PE firms are more attractive to investors as they exhibit greater transparency and 
                                                          
75 Jenkinson and Sousa (2015): Studied 1022 European PE exits between January 2000 and December 2014. Found that secondary buyouts, 
trade sales and IPOs constituted 44%, 42% and 14% of all PE exits, respectively.   
76 KKR (previously called Kohlberg Kravis Roberts) is an American PE firm, founded in 1976, that specialises in LBOs.  
77  The typical requirement for fund contributions are between 1 and 5 million USD – R1. 
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have better access to capital markets, than comparable private PE firms. I believe this trend 
is pressured by the lack of transparency characterising the industry today.” – R1. 
 Limitations and further analysis  
The most prominent limitation of our study is the (somewhat) limited sample sizes used for 
empirical testing. The final dataset encompassed 215 IPOs, in which 60 were identified as PE-
backed and 155 as control IPOs. Our individual PE samples of RLBOs, VC-backed BO-
backed IPOs contained 12, 25 and 35 observations respectively. These sizes are on the lower 
end of what is considered “valid” when conducting empirical testing. Hence, despite our 
empirical testing yielding several (statistically) significant results, we acknowledge the 
individual sample sizes may be insufficient to draw causal conclusions. One could therefore 
enhance our study by investigating underpricing between PE-backed- and NB IPOs 
(employing the same methodology as outlined in Chapter 5) based on larger samples (e.g. use 
a wider time-span and larger geographical area).  
In addition, a larger sample would yield more valid inference regarding (some of) the 
independent variables. For instance, it would be interesting to isolate the effect of RLBOs on 
underpricing employing larger samples sizes (i.e. particularly include more RLBOs and non-
reverse PE-backed IPOs) to allow for further analysis of the relationship between the level of 
underpricing and asymmetric information.  
We also suggest investigating other properties of PE-backed- and NB IPOs, by retrieving 
additional information regarding each IPO. First (and as proposed by a respondent from in-
depth interviews), it could be interesting to examine the relationship between bond-
performance (pre-IPO) and IPO pricing. The respondent suggested that the IPO pricing of a 
firm with publically traded bonds, could be influenced by the bond performance. This could 
be investigated by analysing the interrelation between underpricing and bond-performance78. 
Second, it could be interesting to investigate the (potential) effect of participation rates by 
principal owner(s) of PE-backed- and NB IPOs on underpricing.  
Furthermore, we believe the interrelation between the entry- and exit of portfolio firms would 
be interesting to investigate further. Such analysis could examine whether (certain) selection 
criteria determining entry (or characteristics related to portfolio firms when entered) can be 
related to characteristics surrounding the portfolio firms at exit. In relation to IPO exits and 
                                                          
78This requires a sample with (enough) firms possessing publically traded bonds prior to the IPO. 
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LBOs, further analysis could thereby investigate how/whether circumstances surrounding the 
initial LBO (potentially) affect the performance of the subsequent IPO.  
Section 6.4 discusses potential biases resulting from our data gathering- and selection process 
in addition to limitations related to applied methodologies. 
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8 Conclusion 
This study focused on i) examining differences in IPO underpricing across PE-backed- and 
NB IPOs listed in Nordic countries between 2005 and 2014 (empirical approach) and ii) 
identifying key factors affecting choice of exit route by PE-sponsors and (potential) 
interrelation between entry- and exit of portfolio firms (qualitative approach).  
 Underpricing of PE-backed- and NB IPOs 
We found both PE-backed- and NB IPOs to exhibit significant underpricing (on average), 
consistent with prior research. The mean initial return (EW) of PE-backed IPOs was 2.9%, 
while it was 6.7% and 7.1% for the total-control- and matched-control sample, respectively. 
However, IPOs backed by VC-sponsors were not significantly underpriced, implying the 
(significant) underpricing of PE-backed IPOs was driven by the BO-backed listings in our 
sample.  
Furthermore, we found PE-backed IPOs to be significantly less underpriced than NB IPOs, in 
line with existing empirical research (and thereby also with research question 1). Our result 
appears robust as we reach the same conclusion based on both univariate- and multivariate 
testing procedures. Respondents from in-depth interviews postulated two potential 
explanations to our finding. First, PE-sponsors may be better at timing- and promoting their 
IPOs than managers/owners of NB IPOs. Second, some PE-sponsors may attempt to 
maximise the offer price in order to boost the proceeds from their participation in IPOs. 
However, consensus in prior research attributes the result to the presence of PE-sponsors in 
IPOs certifying that the offer price reflects all relevant (inside) information. It follows that 
through repeated interaction with capital markets, PE-sponsors have reputational capital at 
stake and (potentially) superior expertise and experience in monitoring their investments. PE-
sponsors may also have greater monitoring incentives than owners of NB IPOs as the former 
commonly possess larger equity stakes than the latter.  
Our empirical analysis suggests lower underpricing of PE-backed- compared to NB IPOs is 
primarily driven by VC-backed IPOs. We find that listings backed by VC-sponsors are 
significantly less underpriced than both BO-backed- and NB IPOs, based on all testing 
procedures. In contrast, we cannot document (statistically significant) lower underpricing of 
BO-backed- compared to NB IPOs. This suggests VC-sponsors are able to reduce the level of 
underpricing in IPOs, while the same result does not appear to hold for BO-backed offerings.  
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Finally, we found aftermarket volatility to be significantly- and positively related to initial 
returns, independent of PE backing, consistent with prior research. It follows that investors in 
IPOs associated with high aftermarket volatility require greater initial returns as compensation 
for higher ex-ante uncertainty (and thereby risk) than IPOs with low aftermarket volatility.  
 Exit strategies by PE-sponsors (in-depth interviews) 
Related to research question 2, respondents from in-depth interviews listed price, transaction 
risk and divestment efficiency as the most important factors (in descending order) 
determining the choice of exit route. The majority of the respondents expressed strong 
preference for trade sale (ceteris paribus) due to several reasons. First, trade sale enables 
complete and immediate divestment. Second, (potential) synergies and competition among 
industrial bidders often result in trade sale providing superior pricing over other exit routes.  
IPO, on the other hand, was emphasised as the least preferred exit route by the majority of the 
respondents, due to inefficient divestment and extensive regulation. However, some 
respondents underlined that IPOs may represent the preferred exit for particularly 
“successful” (and large) portfolio firms, as it “enables participation in future value creation 
while at the same time taking some “risk off the table”” - (R4). This suggests a sample of PE-
backed IPOs may be biased towards containing firms that are more “successful” than the 
average NB IPO.  
The interviews left us with the impression that exit- and entry of portfolio firms represent 
interrelated events. PE firms spend substantial amounts of time analysing exit opportunities 
related to a potential target already prior to entry. Moreover, they may in fact refrain from 
entering an investment when they see a challenging exit market. Hence, the exit opportunities 
related to an investment case may have decisive implications for whether the entry is realised 
or not.  
Finally, our respondents underlined several trends in the PE industry. The most prominent 
trends were: i) Growth in secondary buyouts as such exits are characterised by being quick 
and of low transaction risk (although not necessarily providing the best price) and ii) greater 
industry specialisation among PE firms as a result of intensified competition in the PE 
landscape (see quote in Chapter 1).  
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10 Appendix 
 PE-backed IPOs: Sample characteristics 
Table 10-1: Characteristics of the PE-backed IPOs included in our sample 
 
BO/
VC 
Company  
(PN: Previously named) 
Exch. 
ICB 
Industry 
General Partner 
Entry 
date 
IPO date 
VC 
Advanced Production 
and Loading79  
OSE Oil & Gas HitecVision 28.01.2004 18.03.2005 
VC Affecto Genimap HSE Technology CapMan 01.11.1999 27.05.2005 
BO Akva Group OSE Industrials 
Teknoinvest, 
Norvestor 
30.06.1997 10.11.2006 
VC Asetek OSE Industrials 
Northzone, 
Sunstone 
01.01.2006 
(estimate) 
20.03.2013 
VC Bactiguard SSE Health Care Industrifonden 21.12.2011 19.06.2014 
VC Badger Explorer Oslo Axess Oil & Gas 
Convexa Capital, 
Procom Venture 
02.09.2005 25.05.2007 
BO BE Group SSE 
Basic 
Materials 
Nordic Capital  15.12.1999 24.11.2006 
VC Biotec Pharmacon OSE Health Care NorgesInvestor 01.11.1997 04.11.2005 
BO Bufab SSE Industrials Nordic Capital 30.12.2004 21.02.2014 
BO 
Bulten (PN: 
FinnvedenBulten) 
SSE 
Consumer 
Goods 
Nordic Capital  30.12.2004 20.05.2011 
BO Byggmax SSE 
Consumer 
Services 
Altor Equity 
Partners 
08.12.2005 02.06.2010 
VC CellCura Oslo Axess Health Care Maturo Kapital80  
01.01.2005 
(estimate) 
06.10.2010 
BO Cermaq  OSE 
Consumer 
Goods 
NorgesInvestor 15.12.1999 24.10.2005 
BO Chr. Hansen CSE Health Care PAI Partners 01.07.2005 03.06.2010 
VC Clavis Pharma OSE Health Care 
Neomed 
Management, MVM 
15.08.2001 07.07.2006 
VC Dibs Payment Services 
First North 
(SE) 
Industrials Verdane Capital  02.06.2005 18.06.2007 
BO Duni SSE 
Consumer 
Goods 
EQT 30.01.2997 14.11.2007 
VC Endomines  
First North 
(SE) 
Basic 
Materials 
Noweco Partners, 
Finnish Industry 
Investment 
15.01.2003 19.06.2007 
VC Exiqon CSE Health Care 
Teknoinvest, SLS 
Venture81, BioFund 
Management  
05.12.2003 29.05.2007 
VC Funcom OSE 
Consumer 
Goods 
Northzone, Verdane 
Capital 
01.07.2003 13.12.2005 
VC HMS Networks SSE Technology Segulah Advisors 16.08.2004 19.10.2007 
BO Inwido SSE Industrials Ratos 30.06.2004 26.09.2014 
VC Isconova 
First North 
(SE) 
Health Care InnovationsKapital 15.07.2008 10.11.2010 
                                                          
79 Advanced Production and Loading (Acquired by National Oilwell Varco (NOV) in 2010).  
80 PN: BTV Invest. 
81 Scandinavian Life Science (SLS): Result of a merger bt. Sixth Swedish National Pension Fund, Medicon Valley Capital and Innoventus. 
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BO ISS CSE Industrials 
EQT, Goldman 
Sachs PE 
09.05.2005 13.03.2014 
BO KappAhl Holding SSE 
Consumer 
Services82 
Accent Equity 
Partners, Nordic 
Capital 
28.10.2004 23.02.2006 
BO Kongsberg Automotive OSE 
Consumer 
Goods83 
FSN Capital, IK 
Investment Partners 
01.08.2001 24.06.2005 
BO Lindab International  SSE Industrials Ratos 03.07.2001 01.12.2006 
BO Marine Farms OSE 
Consumer 
Goods 
Marin Forvaltning 15.06.2004 12.10.2006 
BO Matas CSE 
Consumer 
Services 
CVC Capital 
Partners 
28.02.2005 28.06.2013 
BO MQ Retail  SSE 
Consumer 
Services 
CapMan  01.04.2006 18.06.2010 
BO Munksjö HSE 
Basic 
Materials 
EQT 01.03.2005 07.06.2013 
VC Napatech OSE Technology 
Northzone, Ferd 
Capital, SEED 
Capital DK 
24.03.2006 06.12.2013 
BO NEAS OSE Financials Reiten & Co 15.11.2000 23.03.2007 
BO Nederman Holding SSE Industrials EQT 17.12.1999 16.05.2007 
VC 
Norwegian Energy 
Corp. (NORECO) 
OSE Oil & Gas HitecVision 01.10.2005 09.11.2007 
BO Odim OSE Industrials 
Verdane Capital, 
Norvestor 
01.12.2002 18.11.2005 
VC Orexo SSE Health Care HealthCap 
01.01.2005 
(estimate) 
09.11.2005 
BO OW Bunker CSE Industrials 
Altor Equity 
Partners 
16.05.2007 28.03.2014 
VC 
QT Software (PN: 
Trolltech) 
OSE Technology 
Northzone, 
Teknoinvest84  
01.06.2000 
(estimate) 
05.07.2006 
BO Polimoon OSE Industrials 
CVC Capital 
Partners 
01.01.1999 26.04.2005 
VC Powel OSE Technology 
Norvestor, Viking 
Venture 
Management 
n/a 24.10.2005 
BO Pronova Biopharma OSE Health Care Herkules85 01.01.2004 11.10.2007 
VC 
Renewable Energy 
Corporation (REC) 
OSE Oil & Gas86 Hafslund Venture n/a 09.05.2006 
BO RenoNorden OSE Industrials 
CapVest, Accent 
Equity Partners 
27.09.2011 01.12.2014 
BO Revus Energy OSE Oil & Gas HitecVision 24.02.2003 27.06.2005 
BO Salcomp HSE Technology EQT 01.10.1999 13.03.2006 
BO Sanitec SSE Industrials EQT 15.04.2005 10.12.2013 
BO SCAN Geophysical  Oslo Axess Oil & Gas Norvestor 03.10.2005 31.05.2007 
BO ScandBook 
First North 
(SE) 
Consumer 
Services 
Accent Equity 
Partners 
27.09.2006 31.03.2010 
                                                          
82ICB Supersector 5300: Retail. 
83 ICB Supersector 3300: Automobiles and Parts. 
84 Teknoinvest entered less than 1 year prior to the IPO. 
85 PN: Ferd Equity Partners. 
86 ICB Sector 0580: Alternative Energy. 
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BO Scandi Standard SSE 
Consumer 
Goods 
CapVest 03.04.2013 27.06.2014 
BO 
Swedish Orphan 
Biovitrum 
SSE Health Care Priveq Investment  01.03.2004 15.09.2006 
BO TDC CSE 
Telecomm-
unications 
Providence Equity 
Partners, 
Blackstone, Apax 
Partners 
20.01.2006 23.12.2010 
BO Thule  SSE 
Consumer 
Goods 
Nordic Capital  08.04.2008 26.11.2014 
VC Topotarget  CSE Health Care HealthCap 29.05.2002 10.06.2005 
VC Transmode  SSE Technology 
Amadeus Capital 
Partners 
01.04.2001 27.05.2011 
VC 
Veloxis Pharmacon 
(PN: LifeCycle Pharma) 
CSE Health Care NB Capital  28.06.2002 13.11.2006 
BO Via Travel Group OSE 
Consumer 
Services 
FSN Capital, 
NorgesInvestor 
15.06.2003 09.06.2005 
BO XXL OSE 
Consumer 
Services 
EQT 02.06.2010 01.10.2014 
BO Zalaris OSE Industrials87 Reiten & Co 15.11.2000 01.06.2014 
VC Zealand Pharma CSE Health Care 
BioFund 
Management, 
Sunstone Capital, 
BankInvest 
30.06.2005 24.11.2010 
 
Table 10-2: PE sample: Offer price, closing price and initial returns 
Sample sorted by initial returns (small to large). Offer- and closing prices are quoted in local currencies.  
BO/VC 
Company  
(PN: 
Previously 
named) 
Market IPO date 
Offer 
Price 
Close 
price 
Initial 
return 
Source: 
Offer 
price 
Source: 
Closing 
price 
VC CellCura NO 06.10.2010 5.00 3.85 -23.00 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC Bactiguard SE 19.06.2014 38.00 32.00 -17.11 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
VC Funcom NO 13.12.2005 15.00 13.50 -10.00 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC Isconova SE 10.11.2010 58.00 53.00 -8.62 % 
(SLU 
Holding, 
2010) 
Euroinvesto
r 
VC 
Zealand 
Pharma 
DK 24.11.2010 86.00 79.50 -7.56 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
BO Inwido SE 26.09.2014 68.00 65.00 -5.15 % 
(News 
Cision, 
2014) 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO TDC  DK 23.12.2010 51.00 48.38 -5.14 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
VC Asetek NO 20.03.2013 36.00 34.80 -3.33 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
                                                          
87 ICB Sector 2790: Support Services. 
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Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO NEAS  NO 23.03.2007 33.00 32.00 -3.03 % Oslobors.no Bloomberg 
BO ScandBook SE 31.03.2010 58.00 57.00 -2.59 % 
(Affärs 
världen, 
2010) 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO RenoNorden NO 01.12.2014 47.00 45.80 -2.55 % Oslobors.no Bloomberg 
VC Endomines  SE 19.06.2007 13.00 12.70 -2.31 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
VC 
SCAN 
Geophysical 
NO 31.05.2007 28.00 27.50 -1.79 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO 
Via Travel 
Group 
NO 09.06.2005 29.00 28.50 -1.72 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO 
Marine 
Farms 
NO 12.10.2006 14.00 13.80 -1.43 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO Polimoon NO 26.04.2005 21.50 21.20 -1.40 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC 
HMS 
Networks 
SE 19.10.2007 74.00 73.00 -1.35 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Bloomberg 
BO MQ Retail SE 18.06.2010 32.00 32.00 -0.62 % 
(MQ Retail, 
2010) 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO Akva Group NO 10.11.2006 35.00 35.00 0.00 % Oslobors.no Bloomberg 
BO 
Bulten  
(PN: 
Finnveden 
Bulten) 
SE 20.05.2011 49.00 49.00 0.00 % 
 (Reuters, 
2011)  
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO Duni  SE 14.11.2007 50.00 50.00 0.00 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO Munksjö FI 07.06.2013 5.95 5.95 0.00 % 
(Unquote, 
2013) 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
VC Napatech NO 06.12.2013 57.75 57.75 0.00 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC Orexo  SE 09.11.2005 90.00 90.00 0.00 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Bloomberg 
VC Powel NO 24.10.2005 15.00 15.00 0.00 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO Salcomp  FI 13.03.2006 3.20 3.20 0.00 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Bloomberg 
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Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
VC 
Affecto 
Genimap  
FI 27.05.2005 4.80 4.81 0.21 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Bloomberg 
BO Cermaq  NO 24.10.2005 44.00 44.10 0.23 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC 
Norwegian 
Energy 
Corp. 
(NORECO) 
NO 09.11.2007 33.00 33.20 0.61 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC 
Biotec 
Pharmacon 
NO 04.11.2005 24.50 25.00 2.04 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC 
Clavis 
Pharma 
NO 07.07.2006 45.50 46.50 2.20 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO 
Lindab 
International  
SE 01.12.2006 110.0 113.0 2.50 % 
 (Lindab 
Group, 
2006) 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
VC Transmode SE 27.05.2011 53.00 55.00 2.83 % 
(Transmode, 
2011) 
Bloomberg 
BO 
Kongsberg 
Automotive  
NO 24.06.2005 46.00 47.50 3.26 % Oslobors.no Bloomberg 
BO Matas DK 28.06.2013 115.0 119.0 3.48 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
BO 
Pronova 
Biopharma  
NO 11.10.2007 23.00 23.80 3.48 % Oslobors.no Bloomberg 
BO 
Revus 
Energy 
NO 27.06.2005 42.00 44.00 4.76 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO BE Group  SE 24.11.2006 62.00 65.00 4.84 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO 
KappAhl 
Holding 
SE 23.02.2006 56.00 59.00 4.91 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO Odim NO 18.11.2005 30.00 31.50 5.00 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
BO Byggmax SE 02.06.2010 46.00 49.00 5.43 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO Chr. Hansen DK 03.06.2010 90.00 95.00 5.56 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
VC 
Badger 
Explorer 
NO 25.05.2007 32.00 33.90 5.94 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
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BO Sanitec SE 10.12.2013 61.00 65.00 6.15 % 
(Sanitec, 
2013) 
Bloomberg 
BO Bufab SE 21.02.2014 46.00 49.00 6.52 % 
(Bufab, 
2014) 
Bloomberg 
BO XXL NO 01.10.2014 58.00 62.00 6.90 % Oslobors.no 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
VC 
Veloxis 
Pharmacon  
(PN: 
LifeCycle 
Pharma) 
DK 13.11.2006 44.00 47.10 7.05 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
BO Zalaris NO 01.06.2014 23.00 25.00 8.70 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC 
QT 
Software 
(PN: 
Trolltech) 
NO 05.07.2006 16.00 17.50 9.38 % Oslobors.no Bloomberg 
BO 
Nederman 
Holding 
SE 16.05.2007 87.00 96.00 9.77 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Bloomberg 
BO Thule SE 26.11.2014 70.00 78.00 11.43 % 
(Nordic 
Capital, 
2014) 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
BO 
Swedish 
Orphan 
Biovitrum  
SE 15.09.2006 100 112.0 11.50 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Bloomberg 
VC Exiqon  DK 29.05.2007 40.00 45.00 12.50 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
VC 
Dibs 
Payment 
Services  
SE 18.06.2007 36.00 41.00 13.61 % 
 Ulf 
Persson. 
Nasdaq 
OMX 
Nordic 
Bloomberg 
BO ISS DK 13.03.2014 160.0                     182.7 14.19 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
VC 
Advanced 
Production 
and Loading 
 
NO 18.03.2005 49.00 57.00 16.33% Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
VC Topotarget  DK 10.06.2005 22.50 26.30 16.89 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
BO 
Scandi 
Standard  
SE 27.06.2014 40.00 47.00 17.50 % 
(Scandi 
Standard, 
2014) 
Bloomberg 
BO OW Bunker DK 28.03.2014 145.0                                 175.0 20.69 % 
Nasdaqomx
nordic.com 
Bloomberg 
VC 
Renewable 
Energy 
Corp. (REC) 
NO 09.05.2006 95.00 117.0 23.16 % Oslobors.no 
Truls 
Evensen. 
Oslo Stock 
Exch 
     
 
 
 
 
91 
 
 Distribution characteristics  
 Untrimmed samples 
Table 10-3: Distribution characteristics of raw initial returns  
The table summarises key characteristics related to the distribution of raw initial returns. Skewness measures whether the initial returns 
are symmetrically distributed to the left and right of the mean. Kurtosis measures the thickness of the tails of the distribution. The kurtosis 
of the normal distribution is 3.  
 
 Obs. Mean Median Min Max Std. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
PE-backed 
 
60 2.847% 2.199% -23.00% 23.160% 8.218% -0.1305 1.4591 
 
Non-PE-backed 
(matched- 
control) 
60 10.603% 2.99% -19.17% 119.31% 24.861% 3.000 12.559 
 
Non-PE-backed 
(total-control) 
155 7.789% 2.593% -19.17% 119.310% 18.776% 3.455 15.437 
 
The graphs below depict the density distribution of untrimmed samples together with the 
normal distribution. Shapiro -Wilks tests confirm the normality of the PE sample (A), and our 
suspicion of non-normality for the control samples (B, C).  
Exhibit A: PE sample Exhibit B: Matched-control sample Exhibit C: Total-control sample 
   
Figure 10-1: The Kernel density distribution of the initial returns (untrimmed samples) together with the normal density 
distribution 
 VW (mean) initial return for untrimmed- and trimmed samples 
Table 10-4: PE-backed and NB IPOs 
 
 Obs. Mean (untrimmed) Obs. Mean (trimmed) 
PE-backed 
 
60 6.197% 58 2.216% 
 VC-backed 25 12.989% 24 1.670% 
 BO-backed 35 4.654% 35 2.289% 
NB (matched-control) 60 5.010% 58 4.853% 
NB (total-control) 155 3,915% 151 3.891% 
     
Trimming the PE sample involves excluding of REC (VC firm) and ISS (BO firm) as 
abnormally large weights (10% and 12% respectively) and initial returns (23.6% and 14.2% 
respectively) distorted the sample means considerably.  
 
 
Residuals Residuals Residuals 
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 EW- and VW initial returns (trimmed samples)  
Table 10-5: NB IPOs 
The table summarises distribution characteristics related to raw, EW and VW initial returns for the (trimmed) total-control sample (i.e. 
151 NB IPOs).  
 Raw IR EW IR VW IR 
Mean 6.664 % 0.044 % 0.0258 % 
Median 2.593 % 0.017 % 0.0016 % 
Min -13.333 % -0.088 % -0.2527 % 
Max 72.727 % 0.482 % 1.0082 % 
Std. 13.916 % 0.092 % 0.1129 % 
Skewness 2.499 2.499 5.875 
Kurtosis 7.831 7.831 46.574 
 
Exhibit A: Raw IR  Exhibit B: EW IR Exhibit C: VW IR 
   
Figure 10-2: The distribution of the Raw, EW and VW initial returns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RAW PE RAW NB EW PE EW NB VW PE VW NB
 
Table 10-6: PE-backed IPOs 
The table summarises distribution characteristics related to raw, EW and VW initial returns for the (trimmed) PE sample (i.e. 58 PE-
backed IPOs). EW returns are calculated based on 1/n as weights (n=total sample size). VW returns are calculated using inflation-
adjusted offer sizes as weights.   
 Raw IR (EW trim) EW IR  VW IR 
Mean 2.9420 % 0.0507 % 0.0382 % 
Median 2.1190 % 0.0365 % 0.0057 % 
Min -17.1050 % -0.2949 % -1.1033 % 
Max 20.6900 % 0.3567 % 0.7406 % 
Std. 7.1370 % 0.1231 % 0.2022 % 
Skewness 0.196 0.196 -2.406 
Kurtosis 0.378 0.624 19.735 
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 Scoring procedure: “Prestigious” underwriters and PE-sponsors 
 “Prestigious” underwriters 
To determine whether an underwriter is considered “prestigious” or not, we developed a 
scoring procedure based on: 
i) The Nordic underwriter ranking by TNS Sifo 
ii) The international underwriter ranking by Dealogic & WSJ88 Investment Banking 
Scorecard  
The Nordic ranking was further separated into country specific rankings as different 
underwriters topped the ranking lists for Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. We 
organised the Nordic ranking by country and year, and the international ranking by year.  We 
deemed an underwriter as “prestigious” if it in the relevant IPO year and market was: 
i) Ranked as number 1 on the Nordic ranking, or 
ii) Ranked among top 10 on the international ranking 
To illustrate, an IPO listed in Norway in 2007 used a “prestigious” underwriter, if the 
underwriter was ranked as number 1 in Norway in 2007 or was among top ten on the 
international ranking in 2007.  
 “Prestigious” PE-sponsors 
When determining whether a PE-sponsor is considered “prestigious” or not, we developed a 
scoring-procedure inspired by the one applied by Schöber (2008). The scoring system is based 
on an overall assessment of four variables that represent proxies for the quality of the PE-
sponsor:  
i) Age of the PE-sponsor. If a firm was dissolved during the relevant period, only the 
active years were taken into account.   
ii) The number of IPOs associated with each PE-sponsor. We assume our sample is 
representative as a proxy for the relative frequency of participation in IPOs by the 
PE-sponsors.  
iii) The average (inflation-adjusted) offer size associated with the IPOs 
iv) Average equity stake held by the PE-sponsors prior to the IPO   
                                                          
88 Wall Street Journal (WSJ).  
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Each PE-sponsor were given a score of 1 or 0 on each criteria, based on its relative 
performance. A PE-sponsor obtained a score of 1 if its value was equal to- or greater than the 
70th percentile value of all sponsors (and zero otherwise). The overall ranking of each sponsor 
was determined by the sum of the individual scores. A PE-sponsor was considered 
“prestigious” if it achieved a score of 3 or 4. Finally, a PE-backed IPO was considered backed 
by a “prestigious” sponsor as long as it was associated with a sponsor (i.e. not required to be 
the lead sponsor) with 3 or 4 points.  
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 Assumptions multivariate regression  
 OLS regression: Assumptions about the error term (Hopland, 2015) 
The ordinary least square (OLS) method provides unbiased (and consistent) estimators 
(?̂?)when A1-A4 are satisfied. An estimator is unbiased if its expected value equals the true 
parameter value, i.e. 𝐸(?̂?|𝑋) =  𝛽. If in addition A5 is satisfied, then the OLS estimator will 
be BLUE89, implying it is the most efficient (i.e. with lowest variance) linear estimator.  
Assumption 1: The regression equation (1) is linear in its parameters: 
(1)  𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝜀 
y represents the dependent variable, X1 and X2 represent the independent variables and 𝜀 is 
the error variable.  
Assumption 2: The error terms (𝜀𝑖) are pairwise independent (i.e. independent samples):  
(2) 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑖, 𝜀𝑗|𝑋) = 0 ∈ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
Assumption 3: The error term (𝜀) is uncorrelated with all independent variables (X1, X2, … 
Xn), implying the conditional mean of the error term must equal zero: 
(3) 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑋) = 0 
(follows from 𝐸(𝜀) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝜀𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖𝑗) = 0, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑘 when we have k 
independent variables) 
Assumption 4: Not-perfect multicollinearity, implying none of the independent variables can 
be written as an exact linear combination of other independent variables. E.g. we cannot have 
𝑋2 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑋1, where b1=±1. 
Assumption 5: The variance of the error term is constant (i.e. homoscedasticity), regardless of 
the value of all independent variables: 
(4) 𝑣𝑎𝑟 (𝜀𝑖|𝑋) = 𝜎𝜀
2 
Assumption 6: The error terms (𝜀) are normally distributed around the mean  
                                                          
89 Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). 
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 Diagnostics: Evaluating homoscedasticity of residuals  
Figure 10-3 depicts the residuals plotted against the predicted values of y. The variance of the 
error term (𝜀)  appears to increase with the predicted y-variables, indicating violation of 
assumption 5 (homoscedasticity). White’s - and Breuch-Pagan’s test confirms the residuals 
suffer from heteroscedasticity (HES). The consequences of HES involve: i) OLS is no longer 
BLUE (i.e. there are other linear estimators with lower variance (more efficient) than the OLS 
estimator). However, the OLS-estimator will still be unbiased. ii) The normal test procedures 
are invalid. Fortunately, OLS represents a valid test-procedure, when asking STATA to 
estimate standard errors that are roust to HES (Hopland, 2015).  
 
Figure 10-3: Residuals plotted against fitted values 
 
 Diagnostics: Evaluating the normality of residuals 
The figure below depicts the (Kernel) density estimates of the initial returns together with the 
normal distribution. The returns appear to be non-normally distributed (confirmed by a 
Shapiro-Wilk test). The consequence of non-normality is less accurate inference. However, 
the OLS method will still provide unbiased estimators.  
 
Figure 10-4: The Kernel density distribution of all initial  
returns (i.e. 215) together with the normal density distribution 
 
 
Residuals 
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 Mathematical explanation: Consequences of OVB 
Assume the true model is given by; (1)𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝑢, but that we wrongfully 
estimate (2)  𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝑤.  
Estimation of the underspecified model yields:  
(3) 𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂ =
1
𝑛
∑ [(𝑦𝑖−?̅?)(𝑥1𝑖−𝑥1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅]
𝑛
𝑖=1
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑥1𝑖−𝑥1̅̅̅̅ )
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 
From the true model (2), we know that:  
(4) 𝑦𝑖 − ?̅? =  𝛽1(𝑥𝑖1 − ?̅?1) + 𝛽2(𝑥𝑖2 − ?̅?2) + 𝑢𝑖 − ?̅? 
Replace (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?) in (3 ) with (4):  
𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂ =
1
𝑛
∑ [𝛽
1
(𝑥
𝑖1
− ?̅?1) + 𝛽2(𝑥𝑖2 − ?̅?2) + 𝑢𝑖 − ?̅?)(𝑥1𝑖 − 𝑥1)
̅̅ ̅̅ ]𝑛𝑖=1
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑥1𝑖 − 𝑥1̅̅̅)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
(5)𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂ = 𝛽
1
+ 𝛽
2
1
𝑛
∑ [(𝑥𝑖2−?̅?2)(𝑥1𝑖−𝑥1)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅]𝑛𝑖=1
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑥1𝑖−𝑥1̅̅̅̅ )
2𝑛
𝑖=1
+
1
𝑛
∑ [(𝑢𝑖−?̅?)(𝑥1𝑖−𝑥1)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅]𝑛𝑖=1
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑥1𝑖−𝑥1̅̅̅̅ )
2𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
By taking the probability limit (plim) of (5), we get:  
 
(6) 𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂ = 𝛽
1
+ 𝛽
2
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥1,𝑥2)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥1)
=𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝜹  
(since 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑥1, 𝑢) = 0 following assumption 3 in section 10.4.1) 
𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂
 becomes (asymptotically) biased since it does not converge (in probability) towards 
the true parameter value 𝛽1 Hence, the bias of 𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂
 is given by 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝜹. The bias arises due 
to the estimator  𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂
capturing parts of the effect of the omitted variable (x2) in regression 
1. From (6) we see that the bias increases with the correlation between x1 and x2 and the 
magnitude of 𝛽2 and decreases with the variances of x1. If x1 and x2 are negatively correlated 
(δ<0) and 𝛽2 is positive (and significant), then the estimator  𝛽1
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒̂
 in (1) will underestimate 
the effect of x1 on y since the term 𝛽2 ∗ 𝛿<0.  
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 Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10-7: Correlation matrix 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
   
Variables lnOS STD 
PE 0,2912 -0,182*** 
VC 0,0144 -0,0417 
BO 0,3431 -0,1849*** 
PRESTUnd 0,4278 -0,1013 
lnOS 1 -0,3427*** 
HIGHTECH -0,1758*** 0,2495*** 
STD -0,3427*** 1 
DK 0,0545 0,1258 
NO -0,044 -0,0544 
SE 0,008 -0,0037 
2009 0,0129 0,1384 
2010 0,065 -0,0205 
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 Additional empirical results 
 One-sample T-tests, using untrimmed samples 
The rather extreme difference between EW and VW return of VC-backed IPOs can mainly be 
attributed to the presence of REC in the untrimmed sample. With a weight of 10% and initial 
return of 23%, including REC appeared to severely distort the VW mean of VC-backed IPOs. 
Related to VW returns of the untrimmed BO sample, we removed ISS as it had considerable 
effect on the sample mean (with weight and return equal to 12% and 14.3% respectively).  
 Two-sample T-tests, using untrimmed samples 
Table 10-9: Comparison of initial returns between PE-backed- and control IPOs (untrimmed) 
The table compares the EW- and VW returns of PE-backed IPOs to other IPOs, using both samples of control IPOs. The t-statistics result 
from t-tests with the H0: “Mean initial returns of PE-backed IPOs and control IPOs do not differ significantly”.  
  Equally weighted  Value weighted 
 Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| 
PE minus matched-
control 
60/60 -7.756% 2.3347*** 60/60 0.358% 0.1864 
PE minus total-control 60/155 -4.942% 2.6799*** 60/155 2.282 1.661 
 
Table 10-10: Comparison of initial returns between VC- and BO-backed IPOs (untrimmed) 
The table depicts the difference in EW and VW initial return between: i) The two PE types (VC and BO) and their matched-control IPOs, 
separately and ii) “diff in diff” between VC and BO (vs their matched-control IPOs).  
  Equally weighted  Value weighted 
 Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| Obs. Difference |𝑻 − 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕| 
VC minus 
matched-control 
25/25 -16.885% 2.4541*** 25/25 0.878% 0.2421 
BO minus 
matched-control 
35/35 -1.235% 0.5072* 35/35 -0.203% 0.0890 
Diff-in-Diff90 - 15.650% 2.1444* - 1.081% 0.2577 
The rather extreme differences between VC-backed and matched-control IPOs when 
employing EW returns (16.89%) arise when the matching procedure is based on the 
untrimmed control pool. The distortion can mainly be attributed to Diadrom Holding AB and 
                                                          
90 Difference-in-difference: We tested whether the difference of 15.65% was significantly different from 0 using the standard deviation of the 
differences from “VC vs. Matched” and “BO vs. Matched”.   
Table 10-8: Initial returns of PE-backed and control IPOs 
The table depicts the mean EW- and VW returns for PE-backed IPOs and the two control samples. One-sample t-tests were employed to 
tests if the mean returns differ significantly from zero. The standard deviation of the mean initial return was used when computing the t-
statistics. 
  Equally weighted  Value weighted 
 Obs. Mean T-stat Obs. Mean T-stat 
PE-backed 60 2.847% 2.6834*** 60 6.197% 5.246*** 
 VC-backed 
 
 BO-backed 
35 
 
25 
1.507% 
 
3.804% 
0.7185*** 
 
3.6824***** 
25 
 
35 
 
12.989% 
 
4.654% 
 
5.251*** 
 
3.665*** 
Non-PE-backed 
(matched -control) 
60 10.603% 3.3036*** 60 5.839% 3.863** 
Non-PE-backed 
(total-control) 
155 7.789% 5.1643*** 155 3.915% 5.576*** 
All 215 6.410% 5.6441*** 215 4.915% 7.045*** 
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BIMobject (EW returns), which exhibited initial returns of 119.3% and 114.7% respectively. 
The two outliers serve as matching partners for the VC sample (when identifying matching 
partners from the untrimmed control pool), and consequently explain the extreme 
underpricing difference of 16.885%. 
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 Multivariate regression incl. dummy for “prestigious” PE-sponsors 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 An interpretation of the constant is not particularly informative as our sample does not include obs. with lnOS and STD equal to zero 
Table 10-11: Multivariate regression incl. dummy for “prestigious” PE-sponsors 
The table below reports the coefficients and the corresponding standard error (in parenthesis) and (absolute) t-values from one regression. 
The regression was run with initial returns (IR) as the dependent variable, and variables assumed to affect initial returns as independent 
variables. The regressions are estimated with standard errors that are robust to heteroscedasticity.  
 (4)𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑂𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽6𝐷𝐾 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑂 + 𝛽8𝑆𝐸 + 𝛽909 + 𝛽910 +  𝜀 
“PRESTspons - dummy variable equal to one if the PE-sponsor is “prestigious” and zero otherwise. “PRESTund” - dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm’s underwriter is “prestigious”. “lnOS” - the natural logarithm of (deflated) offer sizes. “HIGHTECH”- dummy variable 
equal to one if the firm belongs to the telecommunication or technology industry. “STD” - the standard deviation of daily returns over 19 
days, beginning the day after the IPO date. “DK”, “NO” and “FI” – country-specific dummy variables for Denmark, Norway and Finland 
respectively. Hence, Sweden represents the reference category. “2009” and “2010” – time specific dummy variables for 2009 and 2010. 
 (4) 
VARIABLES IR 
PRESTspons -0.00001 
 
(0.01767) 
|t|: 0.00075 
PRESTund 0.02368 
 
(0.01798) 
|t|: 1.31690 
lnOS -0.00322 
 
(0.00616) 
|t|: 0.52227 
HIGHTECH 0.08496 
 
(0.06370) 
|t|: 1.33371 
STD 2.67454*** 
 
(1.06744) 
|t|: 2.50331 
DK 0.00778 
 (0.04318) 
|t|: 0.18006 
NO -0.04234* 
 
(0.02454) 
|t|: 1.72554 
FI -0.07357* 
 
(0.04068) 
|t|: 1.80847 
2009 -0.20572*** 
 
(0.07820) 
|t|: 2.63072 
2010 -0.08291*** 
 
(0.02412) 
|t|: 3.43711 
Constant91 -0.00847 
 
(0.12418) 
|t|: 0.07193 
F-value F(10,202) = 2.63 
 Prob>F = 0.0050 
Observations 213 
R-squared 0.27506 
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 Asymmetric information (informed- and uninformed investors): Winner’s curse 
The “winner’s curse problem” represents a form of adverse selection explained by i) 
information asymmetry between different types of investors and ii) rationing of shares in IPOs 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). Rock (1986), was the first to present an asymmetric information 
model attempting to explain underpricing as a direct result of a “winner’s curse problem” 
(Berk & DeMarzo, 2011). His model, along with the winner’s curse hypothesis, is empirically 
supported and discussed in academic research by Beatty and Ritter (1986), Levis (1990) and 
Ritter and Ibbotson (1995). 
Rock’s model assumes potential investors in the IPO market are either uninformed or 
(perfectly) informed. Informed investors are willing to incur costs to acquire information 
about the aftermarket performance of new issues. These investors will thereby only submit 
share orders in IPOs where the true stock value exceeds the offer price (i.e. underpriced 
offers). In contrast, uninformed investors are not prepared to incur such evaluation costs. 
Hence, they seemingly do not know which IPOs will deliver positive initial returns. Since a 
predetermined number of shares is assumed offered at a fixed price, uninformed investors will 
therefore receive lower (higher) share allocations when the share demand is high (low). This 
implies uninformed investors suffer from a “winner’s curse problem”; they only receive all 
requested shares when the informed investors do not participate in the new issue (i.e. when 
the issue yields poor returns). Uninformed investors will therefore only participate in IPOs if, 
on average, new issues are (sufficiently) underpriced. In summary, informational frictions 
between different investor types may force issuing firms to underprice their IPOs to 
compensate uninformed investors for facing biased share allocation (Levis, 1990). 
 
 
 
